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A THESIS

FUL !LL. E

1962

- STRAOT

on Gener~l Douglas Mae.Arthur 's dismissal

The hearings

conduo ·ted by t .he United

Stat es Senate

Committee on Foreign

Relation s and Committe-e on t ..,_;.
e Armed Services

cerne d with the relationship
militar1

between the civil

, the comparab le importanee

the validity

of the concept

o!

an ex?mination

whieh caused Pre sident

of limite d war .

toward

the

Soviet

aetion

are also

disoussed

general

articles

the published

w-orks,

¢ommittee

of the material

______
o1arifieation

allies,

on the Korean

in the p~~5ressiQnal
by

the writer

of this

thesis

hea ri ngs whieh supp lied

books such as

....,._......,_......,...___
Arms and tb,e
State or Truman's
iii

Record .,

Rovere and Sehles i nger ,

used in tbe thesis .

was needed•

its

•

The General and the President
and other

taken

in the hear•

i ons with

Unio ·R~ and the United. Natitm

of the

examines

postwar China and actions

of Ameri can relat

After reading

part

out the policies

the Korean War as t hey ~ere discussed

in.gs. . The ef f ects

is

and st atements

and the United Natio ns._ It also

American policy
during

This thesia

Truman to doubt the effectiveness

with which the genera l could carry
United States

and the

of Europe and Asia , and

genera l ''s actions

the

were con-

studi

th e main

When additional
1

alter

illis

JV

Memoirs \1ere h~lpful .

''

d

From the testimony
it

iven

is conelud ed th at the Pr esi dent bad jus tif'ia ble reasons

£-o:r dismis sing Doug las

M e Art hut',

alth ough i

t he general ' s · -past serv i ce to the cou ntry,

asked t he general
President

Trtuum aeted

from the Corrunun
ists,
migh t have

~

he

dofe -rence

to

ig ht hav.e

to resign .

world when he committed

\

conunittees

be.f ore the Senate

in the

American

inte rest

of . the free

tr oops to save Sout

Korea

alt hou h the neees s it,y i'or .such action

en avoided

ha d the administration•

Congress ,

and t he co unt ry been wil lin g to spend mo.re money for deter rent

arm s and foro ,es in areas

the cond.it~ons

l imit

existing

t he -war- action

Eur 6pe as t he area

strength

of pro ba ble

confliet,.

Unde r

at the time ·Truman ' s e.fforts

to Kor ea and to give priority

where it was most imp·ortant

!or the containment

of Soviet

eo mm:
en-dable .

iv

to

to

to maintain

expansionism

w re

;t

The wri te:t would like

b1e continued

ottering

suggestions

cor ecting

th&

Dr~ David Warr&n for

the writing

on the writing

of this
0£ the

assistanoe

.

her app.reeiation

university

The writer

as e.1-so ot

would also .like . to

lib ,r-acy tor their

inf'ormatien

By

and in

to the members o.f tn~ start

of Rhode - laland

able help in obtaining

the .sis .

thesis

the nu.¼nus.¢ript• Dr •. Dani .el Thomas

substantial

express

help during

to , thank

of

invalu""

tor the bhesis.,.
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CI1APTER I

INTRODUC
TION
On Apri l 17, 1951, General

returned

to the United States

teen years.
States,

s.

matters

States

pertaining
Vociferous

action

him with the

support

is

to the policies

before

a joint

session

of and ar guments

immediately

demanded permission

burst

of

Nixon suggested

~resident

and pressure

command.

Senator

providing

.for an investigation

In sho nt,

most Republicans

a Senate

Kenneth Wherry

aga inst

to speak
t hey

Mr. Truman .
censure

on him to restore

in

Repub-

In caucus,

of impeaching

as possible

forth.

for t he General

of Congress.

discus se d the possibility

tic al capital

of the United

Government and of the United Nations
to his official
duties . 01

licans

Richard

of four-

of the Army Douglas MacArthur

denunciations

the President's

ator

the President

to give his wholeh~arted

the United

MacArthur

an absence

Truman , had dismissed

"General

explanation,

unable

after

Six days e_arlier

Harry

Douglas

Sen-

of the

MacArthur to his

introduced

a resolution

of' the General's

re moval ..

were out to make as much poliout of this

abrupt

dismissal

,

----~
.......
1 ------------------------Harry s.
Memoirs .,
II:
T!:!a!
and HW;
( New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p ~ 449. See
page
of appendix for excerpts from 'l'rum:sn•s add.ress to
Truman,

the nation .

Vol .

Years

o.f

2

although

a few Eastern

Leverett

Saltonstall,

Meanwhile,

Republicans,
for

exa mple,

Democrats

Democrats
in their

P
th
-0..1.
.·

support

of Truman .

with a plan

than enthusiastic

Senator

Foreign

Tom Connolly,

Relations

Committee,

Russell • Chairman 0£ the Senate

Committee., both supported
soon announced

Truman .

an investigation

the military

Relations

the country
aspects

Committee

by his

in the bearings

.

duced by Senator

A unanimous
Russell

an interest
consent

on April

Armed

committee

When it

was interested

of the question,

expressed

and

Sena.tor

~ · d 1Miac Ar th. ur ' s d.ismissa
·
l •2
e f a.et s b e111n

became obvious that
tban

Republicans

were, in many cases , less

Senat or Richard

Russell

to identify

a major war with China., althou gh Southern

Chairman of the Senate

Services

Truman . 1

support;ed

were seeking

MacArthur and the conservative
for forcing

James Duff and

in more

the Foreign
in participating

decree

was intro-

25 and the hearings

began on May 3. 3
1 New York Time s, Apri l 12, 1951 .
2 fil9: ., April 16, 1951.
3Members of the Committee on Armed Services
Richard

B. Russell,

chairman,

Harry

were

F . Byrd ., Lyndon B.

J ohnson, Estes Ke.fauver , Lester C. Hunt, John c. Stennis
Russell
B. Long, Styles
Bri'dge .s, Leverett
Salt onstall,
layne Morse , William F. Knowland, Harry Cain• Ralph

,

Flartders . On the Committee on Foreign Relations were Tom
Connally , chairman, Walt er :F. Georg e, Theodore Francis
Green,, , Brien McMahon, J . William Fulbright , John J.
Sparkman, Guy Gillette , Alexander Wiley, H. Alexander
Smith,

Charles

Bourke

Tobey .

Hickenl ooper,

Henry Cabot

Lodge,

tTr.,

and

3

19 General Mac rthur

On April
joint

meeting

of Congress

views to the world.
days

main issues

ond .forcefully

In this

to be aired

These were the old argument
trol , the comparable

seale

could

achieve

and the one whiah pr~vented

of the sessions
officer

being turned

Douglas

MacArthur

retary

of Defense

and censored

of th,~ services:
j

General
Chief

over to the press .
was the
George

first

lllbert

next

to answer

.

political

Os

follow .ed by Sec-

of the Joint

questioned

Secretary

c.

~

of

the Chief's of Staff
Air Force

and Admiral Forrest

questions

tltt:

Chiefs

J . Lawton Collins;

C.. Wedemeyer~ Former Secretary

Johnson , Vice Admiral

of the Army

General

witness,

Army General

of Naval Operations

Department

c . Mar8hall , and then by General

Hoyt s. Vandenberg;

appeared

and

by a military

to the State

adviser

The committee$

con-

TranseriJ>tS

in.formation.

of the Army Omar Bradley, _ Chait'man

Sta.ff .

military

them f:rom being held in public

were reviewed

before

versus

of Europe and Asia,

classified

and by a legal

were

eorm.ected with the hearings

One of the main problems

of revealing

there

wa:r, as compared t o a ..largeAmerican objeetives
.1

to whioh a limited

was that

that

the committees .

before

importance

bis

and in the opening

of civil

the extent
war,

speech

be.fore a

presented

it became evident

of the hearings,

three

appeared

of State
.

P . Sherman.
Dean Acheson

Lieutenant

of Defense

G,eneral

Louis A.

ager , Maj or tQeneral

1New York Times, April 15., 1951 (see page 108 of
appendix l.'or ex c erpts-from
address).

4

Emm
ett

O'Donnell • Jr. , and Major General

the other

witnesses .

David

c.

Barr were

CH.AP'f'ERII

POSTW
.PffiRELAT
IONS IN THE FAR EAST
Victory
Although
supposed

over Japan

t he general

purpose

o.f the hearin gs was

to be t he wei ghi ng of General

Republicans

eagerly

MacArthur's

took the occasion

istration

ror allegedly

Democrats

joined

Marshall,

Dean Acheson,

losing

in questioning

fiable

under eondit .ions existin g at the ti me.

Yalta

g overnment

Ae hes ,on spent

hearinss

w.

the

hours

it

background
was seen

Secretary

1

explaini

Averel l Har r i man, to testify
for

The ques -

a written

of a coalition

in ,Chj_na.

of S~ate Dean

an outline

was insufficient

5

of the

at Yalta.
time

in the

o.f t he conference,

orally,
r·eport

China in

conces s i on.s" o!

of the Crime an Conference

t h .a t there

was justi-

ng th e admi nistr ati on's

t:or one o! th e participants

McMahon called

11

and Communists

the stand

several

policy

in the formation

role

George

of Communist

in .Asia a.ftex· 1945 , including

historical
Af'ter

Japan through

of Nationalists

Upon ta.king

policy

our post-war

ranged from the contr ib utions

and the American

War II .

\'iedemeyer , and Pat rick

to ascertain

t he strug gle against

the admin-

'vorld

Hurley

tions

whether

a£ter

China

the Republicans
Albert

to berate

removal,

Senator

by Mr.

Brian

'Harriman..

6

Because

t he sworn statement

committee
tion

whi ch he submitted

is a good summary of t he ad.ministration's

on post-war

events.

explaining

tne official

Russ ian

testimony,

for
of the United States. 1

policy

soldiers

·and civilians

invader

with coura ge .and perseverance

imately

199 German divisions

Axis countries

might,.

indeed,

.have been impossible

Uni.on, Pr esident

this

nation

Roosevelt

By keeping

would be necessary
to maintain

would have attacked

Union had

This
this

without

approx-

of t he other

t he Soviet

invasion
ot her

of t he Soviet

and Prime Ministe r Churchill

of main.taining

good relations

194.5 the administration

participation

ambition

the German

with

t he war.3

during

In February
Russian

.

Because of the strength

the importance

realized

had fought

o,f the Normandy invasion .

in the East. 2

front

as a basis

and 50 divisions

~ngaged in the East,

the dangers

posi-

be used 1n t his paper,

will

it

to geth-er with Dean AQheson's

eased

te t he

believed

in the strug gle against

to ensure

victory .

influence
the Japanese

the Japanese

Because 0£ their

over Manchuria,
there

that

the Russians

in any event.

The

---------------------------·1tJ.s.,

Congress,
Senate,
Committee on Armed Serviee :s
and Committee on Foreign Relations•
~~arin ~s, _The 11U.lit$rz
fil:_tuatioq in the Far E~st, 82d Cong., 1st ess., 195!,
pp .. }328-42. Hereafter
noted as Militarz
Situation
in the
East.
......
........._._
,

Far
.....,

2

Ibiq••

-

· ·

··

'

P• 3329.

3Ibid .. • pp . 1878-79,
Acheson* s testimony.
According
to Sen ator Wayne Morse this would account for commun ications
in the light
of later
which might seem overconeiliatery
events.

?
i mportant

at Yalta

question

soon enough to save American

lives,

only be decided
Japan. 1

the costs

by assessing

In support
tory

in Japan,

troops

of his thesis

on the f irst

I nformation

had a fighti

for an as s ault

an American

force

or fi ve

Harr.iman pointed

men.

still

la nned strate gy

o! 1945 and a lan di ng

had .at

memorandum of the Joint
entry

men, of

s mi ght be as

t he pri mary source

t he Yalta Conference

Chiefs

at as early

with her ability

.fi ve million

t hat casualtie

out that

mation which Roosevelt

sistent

million

o.f approximately

had been es timated
hi gh as a million. 2

"Russia's

s howed t hat the Japanese

as t he spri ng of 194•6 would have involved

which it

that

of vic-

to the ent r ance of American

on Kyushu in t he fall

on Honshu as late

over

day of the Yalta Conference,

available

ng f orce

of a victory

·of Iwo Jima and Okinawa stil l

with the deci s ive battles
ahead .

a que s tio n which could

of t he uncertainty

Acheson r eferred

in Manila

t hey would do so

was whether

of Staff
a date

of i nfor-

was a

of Jan uar y 23, 19~5,
as possible

to engage in offensive

con-

operations

________________________
is necessary

2

1Ioid.,

to provide

maximum assistance

to our Pa ,cific
.__~

PP• 1875-76
and 3332.
..

Ibid.,
p. 1985. In an article
on this part of the
hearin g s in the New York Times or .June 21, 1951, the , correspondent stated
that t he fi gure of a million casualties
men-

tioned by Acheson as necessary to subdue Japan was fantastic,
that thi$ would have exceeded all American casualties
in the
war.
Later in the hearin gs, Patrick
Hurley blamed Ache s on
for the .fi gu re• althou gh it had been published by Secretary
of War Stimson on the basis of military
advice given him.

8

. 111 The Joint

operations
the belief

that

"very

essential

end;

as military

by the

Chiefs

of Sta.ff

were unanimous

a Rus s ian committal

in the Far East

factor"

the war to an early

in bringing

leaders,

they consid ered that

in

was a

a - campai gn

Soviet

Union against the Japanese in Manchuria and
Korea was necessary . 2 Aleo, General MacArthur had very
stron gly urged a landin g on Japan as a means of conclu din g

the war, and according;
would have required
In support
Marshall
fight

support

and neutral
Minister

the determination

the end ~ When Japanese

gence

or the

of the Joi nt Chiefs

Japanese
that

I
\

the atomic

topple

to the Prime
he had mentioned

proposals

It was the

bomb should

Hurley,

l

ills!·,

4 Ibid .,

-

the

testified

produce

that

the shock needed to
Senator

McMahon, chair-

man of the Atomic Energy Committee-, immediately
statement

pressure

have been known at t he time of Yalta

the enemy army from power .

Hurley's

in view

any hope of ending

e . g ., Patrick

it was known or should

army.

to
in Axis

only a tremendous

shock offered
in Tokyo. 4

Some witnesses,

that

representatives

surrender

or an ex t raordinary

army's rule

of the Japanese

an armistice,

of formulating

of t he intransi

intervention,

of Europe had ap pealed

countries

the difffculties

such an action

from Russia . }

of Japan to work for

opinion

M~rshall,

of the need for Russian

emphasized

until

to General

and quoted

p. 3332.

PP• 560-62 .

2

-

a remark of General

Ibid .,

p.

565.

refuted
Leslie

9

Groves,

wartime

project,

that
1

failure.
five

a.dministr

the scientists

had often

Administration

months a:fter

in Ilew Mexico•

Yalta

officials

that

hone

on the brink

held that

not until

explosion

2

the United States

did not need Russian
and t hat tbe Soviet

in Asia was negligible,

the time or Yalta

that

it

that

It would thus seem that

mi5ht w~ll agree with a statement

of

place

take

even then were not sure

and scientists

the bomb was dropped
tion

atomic bomb

.felt

did the first

the bomb would be successful.

altho

head of the

tive

.

by MacArthur

support

Union's

after

contribu-

was by no means evident

at

the bomb would be of any practical

use.
In support
for Russian
read

of the view that

intervention

was widespread,

a speech by Republican

Alexander

on July 25; 1945, long after

advocated

the belief

Yalta,

in the need

Senator
iiley

McMahon

which was given

in which Wiley decidedly

Russian intervention.3

11!?.!,g,.,

p. 2s95.
In , an answer to a letter
from Sen .
Hickenlooper on this subject,
Lt . Gen. Groves asserted
that
Stim son had informed Roosevelt of a ninety-nine
per cent
certainty
on t he part of the scientists
that the atomic
bomb would be succes s ful and very powerful .( ill9. ., P ~ 3119).
2 Ibid.,

p. 229. In an article
in t he New York Times
o.f June--;o-; 1951, William L. Laurence agreed with the
administration
on these points:
few scientists
thou g l$ the
bomb would be powerful and effective;
most believed tha t
the explosion at Alaraagordo would have little
force; and
it was unlikely
that
with only three bombs in existence•
one of them would have been wasted if there was certainty
of the success of the experiment .
3Ioid . , PP• 2060-62.

--

10
The Yalta Agreement
This belief
Japanese

in the need for Rusaian

led to the inclusion

visions

of the Yalta

Agree~ent

East in which Russia

claimed

to the Committees,

tion
lined

the Soviet

of those

before

which Stalin
at Yalta. 1

discussion

Much criticism
invite

informed
his

objective

ope.

reached

situation

in the eo m..t'erence

that

'l'he

.for the

to take part

to
and to

he was not even to be

with China .

_• due to Stalin's

would deal mainly

Acheson explained
insistence

that

with the war in Eur-

was based on prior

exper-

was known in Chungking eventually

the Japanese;

sure of his plans
strengthened, 2

out-

in the Far East in

at the fa ilure

as necessary

for whatever

Sta1in

has been leveled

Keeping Chiang in ignorance

ience,

that

the 1905 .Russo-J.apanese War.

in the treaty

the Yalta Conference

pro-

In his explana-

of the approximate

of the terms dealing

absenc~

.

the

in the Far

then made .formed the ba sis

Chiang Kai-shek

the stipulations

concernin g areas
an interest

1944 as the reestablishment

proposals

controversial

Harriman explained

political

which had existed

help against

Stalin

was unwilling

to Tokyo before

to risk

his Asian forces

disclowere

1 Ibid ., p . 3611. The only difference
between Stalin's
proposals
and the final
agreement was that Dairen was

.first
ma.de an international
port rather
Russia.
The day after Roosevelt

terms,

Churchill

2

~

.,

concurred.

p . 882 .

than

being

and Sta lin

leased

agreed

· to

to the

11

After
relating

quoting

from a book by Edward Stettinius

how Roosevelt's

ing the Yalta

terms

asserted

11

that

death

to Ohian.g , Sen~tor

not play

we did

made China pay the price

necessary

before

the clause

Far ~ast

should

that

agreement

interest

claims

of China's

phrase.

When the Generalis

the Soviet

reaction

help

of the Soviet

the

was believed

Union in the

fulfilled"

eventual

seemed to

had been convinced
concurrence

che~on,

had never been contested
simo was notified

had

the terms

of

long-term
2
by Chiang.

of the Yalta

Agr e ement

to draw up an arran gement

Union .

Gen·eral Wedemeyer painted

Chi ang's

into

and

his o~inion , in the

i11

on June 15, 1945, he proceeded
wit

Smith

made on Honshu "1

Accordin g to

(which were,

of China)

Russian

of China, Roosevelt

the requirement
this

H. Alexander

with our own ally''

b.

11

some to be a betrayal

qualified

could

unquestionably

be

him from report-

for Russia ' s entrance

an attack

Although

the

fair

Again Acheson countere d that

war.

that

prevented

to Yalta .

a different

From personal

picture

of

conversations

with Chiang he knew the shock and hurt felt by him because
on t he subof the Crimean arrangements . 3 When questioned
ject

of Chiang losing

of Ya.1t .a, Acheson said

He pointed
l

face,

especially

he did not believe

to t he long time whic h it

!!2M!•,p.

1871.

3New York Times,

in . Manchuria,

2

~-..

that

this

took Chiang's

PP• 1924 and 1881 .

June 13, 1951.

because
was so .
forces

to

12
reach Manchuria after

the armistices
tor

have l;leen impo $sible

he believed

i atio:nalists

the

to have reached

Manchuria at the end ot the war te ad.minister
of ?00,000 armed Japanese
-falling

into

control

given

Senator

Hiekenlooper

and prevent

provision

to Russia

f'rom

o! the agre ement was the

ever Dairen

spoke of this

in violation

rights

admitted

the surrender

the territory
the hands 0£ the Rus.sians. 1

A controversial

tori.al

would

it

and Port

Arthur.

as granting

When

extraterri-

of the Atlant ,ic Charter,

Acheson

that

we had had to t1se our efforts to obtain
Cbiang•e -aoncurrence on this question. 2 When questioned
Hicken.looper

en this

Acheson replied

deprived
erative

subject

that

again

later

in the hearings,

he did not believe

of the use of these

ports

that

by

.

we..s

China

at Yalta and that

a coop-

might bave been !ormed as it was in the.

relationship

case of Dairen.3
When Patrick

Hurley

spoke be.fore

committees., he aroused .further
that

controversy

by

wa$ sick at Yalta and that

Roosevelt

not represent

the investigating

tbe Agreement did

belie.rs..

Accot'ding

ta Burley,

had commissioned

hi m to try

to soften

or even set

Yalta Agreement.

and to do this,

Moscow.

By the

Un&er orders
Stalin

his

maintaining

time

.from President

and discussed
1Milit,q

he reached

•

the

Si.tuati,on
.

Teheran.

Roosevelt

£

'•

had died.

be met

Agreement with him.

i~ the Far East,
•

as -ide the

had sent him to London and

'Fruman to eontmue,

Yalta

Roosevelt

Admitt -ing

PP• 18?1-?2.
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that

he left

optimistic

meetings

from a possible

claimed

with the Russian

about the possibility

resulting

State

these

that

suade the State
Agreement .

ill

e.ffeets

power, Hurley
if the

to do something

had not intervened.

the armor of the British

off

in Russian

have been able

he might

Department

of warding

increase

over-

leader

He had made a dent

in

and Russians , but could. not per -

Department

of any changes

needed in the

l

Stilwell

in China

and Hurley

Much of the hearin gs was eoneern-$d with the Communist
of China .

In 19'+4 General

.American officer

in China,

conquest

cipal

the forces

against

of General

the Japanese,

American direeti'on
forces

to fight

offensive

Hurley

against

was appointed

Stilwell,

became convinced

Chiang Kai-shek

prin-

that

He also

believed

if

were to be eff .ecti ve

they would have to be brought

which had be en withdrawn

the Japan~se
the

.

Joseph

that

under

Na.tionaljst

from the struggle

against

the Communists should once again ta.lee
the .foreign enemy. 2 General Patrick
personal

representative

o! President

_,___
__________________
_
Roosevelt
General

,

in ~ugust

Stilwell

1944- to adjust

differences

between

and Cbjang Kai -shek.

l Ibid ., PP• 2885-88
. .
2 Aecording to General Wedemeyer , the actual contribution of the Chinese Communists in · the struggle
against Japan
was limited.
On the other hand, neither
was the number o.f
Nationalist
troops occupied in fighting
the Communists very
large (ibid.,
pp . 2298 - 99) . Secretary
Marshall gave a differof Nationalist
contributions;
he thought
ent interpretation
the record showe~ Stilwel l's belief
ln too great an involvement of the Nationalists
· against the Communists to be true

-

(~

.,

p . 460) .
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According

accept

the American

Roose velt.

wrote

pointing
belief

out his
that

the

this

Burma . 1

Ameriean

a visit

and stating

milita:r·y

Stilwe11•s

sincerity

the Soviets

the unification

of China,

recall.

but also

that

China.

the problem

While discussing

the internal

Russia would le ave Chinese

Because

it

of this

to adjust

without

Russian

After

Chinese

of. Russo-Chinese
leader

affairs

of
rela-

the impres-

aloe.

The

even negotiate

information

of the Chi-

on the independence

great ly his
support

a meeting

program

they

to please

it neces-

•• pp. 2868-72.

the Communists;

would have had to accept

with Mao Tse- -tung,

Communist Party,
1~

Govern-

developm ents

nese Communists from Moscow, Chiang did not feel
sary

aid in

with the Chinese Commurust
was a group without foreign
entan glements. 2

could

since

to Washington

the Soviet

with Chiang , Hurley gave the Chinese

Party,

was much

would welcome United States

for

ationalists

his

judgment ., as was

and reported

ment was not responsible

sion that

the Gen-

1

to conduct a .full campaign in

not only that

tions

from

to the American president

with Stilwell

lacked

to

a telegram

to Molotov in Moscow1 Hurley

with Russian

impressed

he received

me.asage an ultimatum

differences

He soon requested

After

as Chiang was about

an aide-memotre

from his refusal

evident

just

proposals,

Considering

eralissimo

·

to Hurley,

General
2

chief

of the

Hurley brought

Ibid.,

his

PP• 2864-65.

back to
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/
)

Chungkin g a .five-point

program for

sett>lement

Communists .

The Communists evidently

negotiations

to political

military

the Japanese

assistance,
able

The struggles

.

over many cities

They ·had asked the Russians

Later,

to enable

and railroads

that

surrendered
With

.

the Nationalists

and were

They were not,

departure

their

to gather

.

from

in the area .
an agr eement for

and Communists in 1946,

were to move into Man-

However, the Communists took advanta ge o.f t he .first

churia.
opportunity

they had

to move

In his testimony
that

Soviet

that

the domination

troops

into

General

the vacuum . 1

Marshall

spoke of rumors

in such a way
by the Communists was a.ssured . 2 In dis-

were removed f rom Manchuria

ways in which the growth of Chinese

have been halted,

General

Communism could
t hat at th -e end

Wedemeyer testified

of World War II he had wanted to put United States
in Manchuria
that

American

of t he countryside

was discussing

between t he Nationalists

it was decided

cussing

control

forces

when General Marshall

a cease-fire

of territory

to delay

Chiang•s

to

between the National-

moved into Manchuria

however , able to gain complete

Manchuria

eonsenting

August 15, 1945.

began after

the Nationalists

to take

hoped to use these
before

and the Communists for control

ists
by

inte gration

advantage

with the

to set up a Darrier

MacArthur

a probable

had refused

against

to make them available

need for them in the occupation
2

3New York Times,

the Soviet

~

Union, but
because

of Japan . 3

. , PP• 696-9? .

June 13, 1951 .

divisions

of
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Sta te Department

Officials

Meanwhile some Foreign
China were reporting

in China

Service

to the Department

Kuomintang was becoming steadily
nists

were increasing

more popular
Department
lette~

officers

and others

of otate

weaker , while

that

personnel

The sharpest
was read

more and

of resignation

cfti t i eism of State

Senator

by

the

the Commu-

in stren gth and receiving

support .

in

Smith from Hurley•s

in 1945 in which he alleged:

While these objectives
had the sup port of the
President
and the Secretary
of Sta te it is noseer et tha t the American policy in China did not have
the support of all the eareer men in t he State Department . The professional
Foreign Service men
sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and
the imperialist
bloc of nations whose fOlicy it was
to keep China . divided against hersel.f.

In his testimony
four political.

General Wedemeyer agreed that

advisers--John

Davies , John Emerson,

Ludden , and J.ohn Service--submi
ably criticised

the Nationalist
~ommunist regime. 2 Be admitted,

tted

on this

point

me-moranda which invari-

:t0wt.ve-r, that

Russell,

and when

oonceded

of the Chinese

than he had been in a speech in 1947 before

the

the career

and exp erienced,

by Senator

they were not any more critical

Raymond

Government and praised

men seemed to be very intelligent
questioned

his

that

Nationalists

a Senate oom-

mittee,.3
In his testimony

before

t he Committees,

General

____________________
,_
Hurley

reported

rinding

the

career

men actually

1Military
Si~uati9.n in the F~r East,
2 Ibi£.,
3~-•
pp . 2401 and 2496.

passing

p. 18?5.
p.

2524.
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secret

information

quoted a report

to the armed Chinese Communists.

of John Service

had obtained

Hurley

Foreign

Service
States

United

and realize
prestige

.from a Chinese

officer
should

tihat the

at its

lowest

point .

Nevertheless,

in this

report

When confronted

vice in China,

Foreign

He remarked that

tion .
ward. wa

that

Relations
he thought

Chinese Communists during
land maintained

with its

on the

Department's

extended

and atter

"the so-called

ser-

hearings

Committee on this

ques-

the view then put for-

in what

aware ef the nature

t ba t they were not;

of Raymond Ludden that

in China

Service'

statements

General ·Hurley was mistaken

Were American personnel

the

on the Kuomintang . ~1

in the State

Dean Acheson recalled

be.fore the Senate

that

upon America for sur-

with ·Rurley's

o.f those

which

seems to have been

but we are in no ways dependent

Communist leanings

line

Kuominte.ng was in a crisis

1

in which the

the opinion

take a more realistic

the °Kuomintang is dependent

vival,

Stilwell

Communist,

had expressed

most extreme statement
that

to General

He

the war?

he

s·aid .,2

of the

Senator

Know-

he quoted from a report
Communists are

1Ibid . , pp. 2911-12.
General Hurley later accus d
Servieeorbeing
pro-Communist and of delivering
important
Stat
Department documents to Philip Jaffe, editor o! the
magazine Amerasia and allegedly
a Communist . Service bad
once suggested that America he prepared te arm any Chinese
forces which could be used effeotively
since the American
7
purpose was to maintain a degree o.f !lexibility
which would
permit cooperation
with anyone furthering
a "united,
democratic,
friendly
China <!!?.li• • pp., 2929-,0) . "
2

illg . , p.

1875 •.
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agrarian

re:formers

anything

else.

concern

o:f

of a mild democratic

Acheson maintained

the American personnel

United

States

effort

had been to try

to .fight

stripe

interests

the Japa:nese"

ple who considered

on the contrary,

that

during
all

the war their

forces

the Communists merely
rep orts

Department

agrarian

they referred

to Moscow

and to the Marxist rigidity

of the Chinese

nists . 2

General

he did not find

State Departmen t personnel
least

dealing

Commu~
any

with the Communists,

at

when he was in Cbin-a.3
After

in

that

peo-

ref'ormers;

training

Barr testified

.first

in China together

He knew of no State

in their

the first

in China was in serving

and that
to bring

more than

State

the

realized

General

Hurley• s diatribe

Departm ent and his

the dangers

to several

instances

avowal

against

he had always

that

of Communism, Senator

the "Communists"

McMahon pointed

when Hurley had advocated

appeasement .

In a speech on November 29, 1945 1 the Genera l bad stated
/

that

the "only di.fferenee

between the Chinese

and Oklahoma Republicans

l

~•,

P• 892 .

is that
2

!MS.,,

Communists

the Oklahoma Republicans
.
·
PP • 1858 and

18?►?4 .

3rbid •• pp . 2971-?2 . All those appearing before the
two comm'Ittees main tained that they had always known the
nature of Chinese Communism. Answering Sen . Bridges'
query
on whether the War Dept. had not reported in 1945 1that the
not agrarian reformers,
Sec .
Communists were definitely
Marshall testified
that 1hen he went to China and looked
over the situation,
he had no doubt but that the 1eadership
of the gr oup was Marxian Communist , especially
after seeing
a hugh picture
of Lenin and Stal in at Yennan,.. He recalled
Chou-En-Lai protesting
in 1946 against some Chinese dragging
Stalin's
portrait
through the mud (_!lli ., pp, 377•? 8 ) .
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aren't

armedo"

Hurley de£ended

himself

McMahon had quoted out of context;
to a period

while

saying

by

that

what he had said

.

referred

going on and when it

the war wa s still

was neces s ary to get the Chinese Communists and Nationalists
together
against Japan. 1 However, the war and the need for
uniting
speech

against

Japan were over at the -time Hurley made this

in the latter

half

The Marshall
In a general
his testimony,
that
of

of 1945.
and Wedemeyer Reports

statement

Secretary

on China at the beginning

of State

Acheson stres s ed the fact

American aid, could not of itself
<it. reci

-pient

government , that

insure

and with the people.

moments o.f decision

in China after

task

throughout

eral

ef extending

the nat .~on.

Wedemeyer protested

had not fully

a_preciated

the

authority

of the Chim~se

report

o.f November 1945 Gen-

that

the staff

of the Generalissimo

the importance

of logistic

support

o! the troops

meyer had also

advised

Chiang to concentrate

assistance
try

of . foreign

to concentrate

Manchuria,

through

administrators

his military

reaching

area. 2 Report ing that

an agreement

out

the war, he spoke first

In his

in e outh Cina

rested

In pointing

transportation

the .situation

the survival

the power of decision

with the government

of the

o!

in Manchuria.

reform

and
Wede-

on stabilizing
and, with the

and technicians,

efforts

in North China,

to
not

with the Communists in the

the Nationalist

Government was

1 New York Tim~s , June 22, 1951.
2 Military
Situation
in the Far Eas~, PP• 1840-42.
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completely

unprepared

for the occupation

the .face of Communist opposition,
su g';;ested

th at the

with the Russians
in Manchuria. . 1
When open civil
and Nationalists

positions

permitted

giving

of contributing
was co ntrary

important

and offering

American
t he

eco~omic

assistance

General

furt her this

a genuine

willin

-

over the divided

country .

aid to help the
of the American

of

aid to the Chinese

Nationalists.
out an agreement. 2

of s tate

dissident

the settlement

in a memorandum to
Byrnes .

The memo-

China.,.

In order

elements

in the country

of their

gness to compromise."

I bid • • p . l 8 l}2 •

the

goal was "the development

and democratic

1 Ibid . , P• 461.,
2

influence .

had been outlined

development.

shou.ld napproach

might have

a compromise position

our long-range

of a stron g ~ united,

testi-

was to go to China to implement

as it

that

In his

had consider&ble

to the wishes

ar Dep ar t ment by Secretary

r andu m stated

we.ve several

could ha'V'e be en for

unlimited

L working

Marshall

policy

positions

However,, this

to take

Thus Washin gton chose

people.

respective

could have ta.ken.

who still

in the area,

Nationalists

on their

out completely.

The alternative

an

would have to come to

t hat one ~ction

the Japanese.-

- Bnd strength

Wedemeyer further

China in 1945, there

States

mony ean Acheson said
to pull

in

war broke out between the Communists

in North

the United

America

General

Nationalists

agreement

of Manchuria

differences

to

with

Chiang Kai-shek's

This was on Povember 20, 194-5 .
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government
cracy,

afforded

although

the most satisfaetory

it

should

o! other

sentatives

be broadened

organized

In his instructions,
persuade

the Chinese Government to oall

ab-out the unification
Consultative

gave Marshall

permission

China disunited

enumerated.n

Coalition
During his

had only a vague concept

dur i ng his

pervi.se

a People's

The President
frankness
t hat "a

could not be con-

plaee .for American assist2

Marshall

admitted

that

he had

of the changes of government in

party

as conceived

by Sun

Yat -sen.

most of his working knowfedge on these
flight

to Chin .a.. 3

Ameriea.n representative
agreem~nt

to bring

Government in China

tastinioey

China or of the single

confer-

to .the effect

strife

as a proper

ance along the lines

He ~cquired

leaders

calling

Soon after

was successful

.for the cessation

the execution

to

the Chinese Commu-

to speak with the utmost

and torn by civil

realistically

to try

He mentioned that

in Chungking .

and other

to Chiang Kai-shek

repre-

elements

(POC) which included

in session

a demo-

a national

of major political

o.f China..

Council

was already

sidered

to include
in China ..1

Truman asked Marshall

ence of representatives

nists

groups

base for

of this

his

subjects

arrivals

in securing
of hostilities

the

an
.

To su-

Truce Agreement ·of January

1,

1 Ibid., pp. 3184--85. Marshall testified
t .hat Byrnes,
Undersecretary
o:f State
Acheson and John Carter Vincent;
head of the China group in the .State Department;
had probabl1 drawn up this
report .,
2
3Ibid., p . 548.
~
., P• 3185.
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1946, . representatives

Nationalist

of the Chinese

Government,

headquarters

and of the United States

in Pe·iping.

Truce

groups were also to be sent
terms were carried

out.

adopted resolutions
State

Council

set up ·

teams composed of the three

into

th-e field

The People's

calling

the

t

tbo make .sure the

Consultative

Council

for the reconstr uct ion of the

on May 4 1 1946, of a
1
Assembly to adopt a perm.anent co nstitution.

National

and for the convocation

Much discussion

in

Euc·actly had advocated

ment .

Communist Party

Marshall

said

the

hearin t:s centered

about

who

t he formation

o.f a coalition

govern-

th i!lt the first

United States

suggestion

for Communist participation

in the Government -was made

by

Gauss when in 1944 he sug gcs.rted to Chiang
of a war council. 2 In November of that yeax

.Ambassador Clarence

the possibility

General

Hurley

took active

measures to he lp .form the coali-

tion . ;
One minor argument of the hearings

gram approved

by

MacArthur,

Wedemeyer,

Spruance , commander of the

g.overnment.

coalition

lined

basis

negotitation

and Raymond A.

5th Fleet,

indicated

support

o.f a

the tele gram, whic h out-

advocated

in China and then suggest-

American assistance
!or

a tele-

Acheson read

moves the military

ed that

was whether

to China

[sicl

by the

be made available

as

American Ambassador

to

0

1Harold Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics
.in the Post--war
Period; (New York: .Appleton, dentury::Cro.ft.s. Inc., 1956),

pp'.

roa...09.

2~i!J::t~r:;y Situation
3,Ibid .,

p.-. 1919.

in the Far East _1 P• .544.
Testimony

0£ Dean Acheson.
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bring

together

and e.f!eet

a compromise

between

opposing groups in order to promote a united,
China,. •tl

inter

that

MacArthur responded

ox a coalition

support

graph attached.

it

democratic

was beyon

report.

As proo:r that

tele gram was not -viewed in 1946 as a support
government , MacArthur- telegraphed

thereafter

.

According

site

an alliance

to

the

this

of a coalition

Committees

that

the tele gra:m when the two m.-etsoon

to MacArthur -• the e.f.t'ect of the

Ma.r$hall mission (to uee American assistanee
force

be lie£

government from one small para-

to a technical

~arsha ll had not Illentioned

the major

as a. weapon to

with the Communists) was the exa~t oppo-

o! the id.ea$ of the MacArthur- Wedemeyer- Spruan ee tele-

gram.2
General

taken

Wedemeyer

out oL context

the position
enabling

it

also

asserted

Japane-se troops .3

the paragraph

was

from a m~ss age attemptin g to strengthen

of the Nationa list
to fill

that

Government ; especially

any vacuum left

Unde.r further

in

by t he withdrawal

examination

of

by Democratic

'

Senat ors,

Wedemeyer aeknowledg$d that

be had wanted some

kind o! arran gem~nt between the Co~unists

to rehabilitate

Alth ou gh this

the ¢ountry.

act.J.y the purpose which the administration

and Nat ionalists

was almost

gave as Marshall's

m:tssion , it would seem that

the Presi4en t•s directive

Marshall

especially

went much further,

in advocating

use of economic persuasion.
l Ibid.,

pp . 2247-4-8.

3Ibid . , pp.

2297-98.

2

!,bid.•

ex-

p . 2249.

to
the
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Did Russia .favor a Eappr_2ehatnent of the National•
ists

and the Communists?

military

there

intelligence

were reports

Senator

report

Bridges

of 1945 which st ated t ha t

of Russia wanting a coalition

ment established

in order

might eventually

become the exclusive

nese Communists•

who could

ing the

meth◊ds

that

gain

after

the war• t he report

rejected.
that

1949• Dean Acheson had .stated

peace in the Far

as a summary oft-he

this

the tenor oi the report

report

by

an o.t.ficer

fhe summary did not re-

as a whole and had 'been with,,.-

intelligence

division.

i.n the meantime it had been circulated
by Representative
Juda. 1

NevertheleJJs,

among Congressmen

According to Dean Acheson• milita?;"y men assented
Marshall's
ali.st

e!'fort

oo.ntrol

Nationalists

at mediation

over North China

attempted

in

verai.on had been

coUtplet(t report

who had worked on the original.

out Q! Rus-

on this

questioned
that

government,

The American

of China to keep it

sian control .. When previously

drawn by the military

the Kuomin•

idea of a eoalition

coneluded • however,

E$.St depended on the unity

C-onsi·der-

hand.

Genl?ral Assembly idea

an idea which Chiang bad already

.fleet

of th-e Chi-

which might be used to bring

and the Communist-sponsored
·,

written

terrain

t h e upper

m~ntioned the Nationalist-sponsored

report

govern-

North China and Manchuria

tang and the Communists together

- military

o! a

read part

to

aa the only hope tor

ti'fation-

and Maneburia.

the

to maintain

When

and improve their

25
position

in Manchuria

they would fail.

The only question

would be.

failure

.ro mitigate

advised

In July 1947 General
China to advise

hands,

Nations

that

action

.

In a report

de-

to

to Washing -

falling

into

Soviet

to a Communist-dominated

China should

to bring

and the creation

of military

edemeyer was sent

the dan ger of Manchuria

He sug gested

United
ties

Albert

which would lead ultimately

China.

the

them not to take indefens-

the Nationalists

he stressed

was how disastrous

the e.f.fects

1

feat , the United States
ible positions . 1

ton,

the American view was that

by force,

promptly

request

about a cessation

of a collective

of hostili-

trusteeship

composed

or, perhaps
Bri t ain,

, China, the Soviet Union ,_the United States , Great
and Franoe . 2 Marshall .pointed out that Wedemeyer

proposed

to place

the Chinese

problem be!ore

Nations;

however.

the United

tates

United

Nations

particular

jurisdiction

country .

would have greatly
times

that

testimony

embarrassed

the Russians
General

since

at the time of bis report

3Ibid .,

-

2

a

many

to do with any settlement

as trustees.3
that

In

he had made
for China,

the United States,

!_lli . , pp. 2295-2308 .

PP• 372 and 54?.

that

for a trusteeship

to save as much as possible

p . 2029 .

within

Chiang , who had stated

edemeyer asserted

proposals

rug . ,

to events

or British

these

1

was not eonvineed

Also , the proposal

he would have nothing

which included
his

extended

the United

had just
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played down t he capabilities
had hurt them deeply . 1

of the Nationalists

and t hus

American Aid to the Nationalists
During

the hearings

there

questi -on of aid to China.
States

ists

sent

conside r able

after

the Japanese

were many ar guments

asserted

Acheson
equipment

a large

of ammunition and arms le.ft

consisted

t hey withdrew from the mainland .

sug gested
tary

neve r theless,

Acheson said that
he did admit that

Wedemeyer sug gested
sendi.ng

as moral

however, that

tailitary

aid.

Ke!auver pointed

reque s t for i ncreased

turned
ones. 2

t han military

his

mi s si on he had
advi .s~rs

to China.

Re did. not believe,.

lost

had recom nended t ~at China

of its

rather

and economic

and mate r ial

for mili-

t his was not correct;.

after

that

when

Hieke nlooper

some of the planes

t he NationalistS.

of equip ment . ,
paper

of this

the marines

by

When Senator

over mi ght have been c argo planes

as well

part

Nati ,onal ..

t hat much of the equipment was useless

operations,

advocated

th a t t he Unite d

to t he Chinese

surrender;

on t he

China because of lack

out that
inform

mat ·erials

t he Wedemeyer
the

Unj.ted

and advisers.

Nation .s

']}o

the Senator this did not s eem to be a direct reoommendation
!or aid . 4 Acheson had earlier
said that alth ough 'edemeyer
had not

positively

su gg ested

atm ding

aid,

was possible

it

to read th at in ·to his report.

1wew York Times. June 12, 1951.
2
~ilitarl
~!!uation
in the Far East•
3Ibid.,,

p •. 2}29 .

4~.,

P• 188?~

PP • 2044-45.

2?
In speaking

Marshall

o! assistance

mission,

Senator

t0 be used in .fighting
there

too w~ak to sett.le
preferabl

a civil

war,.

belie.f

t hat

a. strang

WS.$

their

that

no weapons w-e.re

Acheson's
the

written

answer was

National .ists

w~re

problen,ts by f.oroe and that

was

it

When g_u~stioned on a s,ta1te.ment

e to neg ·otiate.

made by President

t -ime of the

Knowland read a paragraph

11, . 1945. which stipulated

on October

that

up to the

sent

Truman in Dec&mber or 1946 .that

given to China did not include

material

war material , Acheson -ex....

t.his wa$ duri ng a tim.e when an embal"go against

plained

.that

sending

war goods to China was in efieet

(!rozn August 1946

t -o May 194?). 1
Congress

later

support.

When Senator

ment with

O•pposins

Bridges

a larger

Congress,. Marshal l replied
tually

State

eha?J>gedthe State

approp ·r·iation

that

had earlier

explai ned that

support

f:t•om the

which he had to de-al.
0£ about

10,000

and direct

so many men.
military

o.ffi -cers

could

bad ac-

ot

Secretary

much of the dit'iio-ul-ty

various

financial

and technieiana

egitnei~s

need5d

in China• Marshall

not have committed itself

An indication
to send

Eightieth

was
with

As he reoe.ll.ed . · edemeye.r • s estimate

the &peraticn

the Go.vernment

by the

'11he !ormer

mill tary

Depart-

the Administration

request .ad $5'?51 00o.ooo-. 2

in getting

the

3400 ,J:>Oo,ooo for

appropriated

a large

of why it
force

to ov·er .s~e

asserte-d

that

to s¢nding

was impossible

te the Pt.a.r East

for
was that

----------------------------

28

there

were only one and a third
Unit-ed States. 1
Several

times Senator

men.t by Marshall

Hiek:enlooper

in 194? that

that

this

statement

been supplied,
effectively

and supply .
States

:was their

ican equipment,

equipped

weaknesses

o! the Chi-

ignorance

of logistics

eomplete

ten

ministration•
.generous .

s ef.forts
Refusing

serv ed that

there

were two oppos-.

on the adequacy of American

Badger,

to aid China w-er~ haphazard,

to accuse

what had ear l ier

an.1 speei.f'ie

al though

persont

he ob-

been an even chance o.t sav.ing

in send-

North China was los-t; in 1948 by a fiVEf-month delay
ing

Amer-

Naval Commandei:'in the
World War II , asserted that the Truman ad-

Viee Admiral

Far East after

with

all of which was loat. 2

0£ view presented

aid in 1948 .

the United

divisions

Chinese

To·ward ·the end of the hearings
ing points

w'6nt

would llave been

it

According to General Collins,

had .fully

troops

not t hat they bad

that

One of the great

nese Nationalists

Acheson

Even i.f more equipment had

it ls not certain
used .

per gun .

only that

ammunition,

two rounds per gun .

up a state•

were sent to .North

troops

indicated

to North China with l ittle
literally

brought

of ammunition

China with only two rounds

replied

in the entire

divisions

American arms • .3 He also proclaimed

that

the ten per

cent of our equipment whi.eh did reach Chiang was of little
1

lo1d .

t

P • 465..

2

~.

1

pp . 1888 and 122;

3Nt:tw.Xork Times, June 20, 1951.

~
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or no use. 1

In the same vein,

that

much of the equipment

iron

because

things

the Chinese

Barr,

in 1948, refuted
pons could
that
cause
ists
them,

parts

whenever

lost

such

replaced . within

themselves

Badger

to make

did receive,

they

in the end leaving

a battle,
supply

two

0£ con-

arms by failing

arms t he Nat ionalists
lost

The Nati onal-

of weapons sent

even accused

in shipping

they

to China

to the Communists be-

were quickly

the Communists with a greater
pons than they

time for

Commander, he believed

and corrupt .ion .

Barr

to the,delay
What

scrap

no amount of wea-

the ineffectiveness

General

days .

requisitions~
forfeited

the Chinese

own ineptitude

while · missing

testified
than

mission

Alle ging that

Government

had exag gerated

tributing

had no use at that

Badger.

the Nationalist

or three

was of no more value

head of our military

have saved

of its

Wedemeyer

2

as road graders.
General

General

of American-made

wea-

had .3

China White Pap er
When it

became evident

were going to lose

China,

in 1949 that

the Department

a paper explaining
the situation,
Pape •4 Acheson testified
that

the Nationalists
of State

prepared

known as t he China

tlhite

he recommended t he

-----------------------------June
1951.
1 Ibid.,

--

2Milit@£?

21,

s ituation

in the F ar Eas~ , P• 2330.

11
3william s . White,
General Barr Defends U.S. China
Policy, Q New York Times, June 23, 1951.
4 united States Relations
with China, Publication
3573, Far Eastern Series 30, 1949.
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publication

. of this

the facts.

In this

paper

should

cessity

Qi preparing

the

Nat;ionalist

that

w.eakriesses

lication
great

been driven

which was also

since

to destroy

it

the

not to destroy
tained,

in vain against

out

China

of !iorthern

consequently,

contained

the Nation alist

China in 1949.

do so.

... .....

nothing

aid,

2

bringing

He denied

-

effort

He also
military

of the reby Acheson

asserted

that

inaccuracies,
in

of t he paper was if
Government . 2 Acheson main-

that

short

including

In a letter

asserted

1}:!ilitat"y

have had a

the issuance

regime.

coul .d hav e maintained

the forces

pub-

asked what the purpose

eeonomie and military

State.had

l'Zati<'malists

and oth r shortcomin gs which remained

however , that

troops;

out-

out

ab-out to tall;

the Nationa list

He

The ne-

o.f Defense Louis Johnson testified

the paper had originally

the paper._

.

.Acheson pointed

s-een1ed to be a deliberate

corrected;

know

possibility

Paper could no longer
on Chiang •s fate . 1

he had argued

later

fall.

of the White
effect

port,

.for

were revealed.

Former Secretary
that

for this

result

might

Chian g had already

to Canton,

Government

the public

wei sh ed any harm which

their

the American people

way they would not be so tho.roughly

shocked

if

to let

country

American

the use of our own

the Nationalists

of that

this

of unlimited

in South

year the Secretary
had tried

of

to influence

the Communists to power, but could not
Senator

Situatiop

Ibid •• p . 1867.

Knowland • s accusation

that

this

in the Far _East , pp. 1?69-?0.
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was a defeatist
!or

attitud

e compared with our stand

the circumstances

In reporting
Paper,"

the discussion
that

led us to maintain

Government

and to consider

evertheless
munists

in China were quite

James Reston · noted

publication

, when the

"dust

of this

a mj_litary

settled

paper

to it. 2

mission

in China in 1949, Com-

11

was set

for

conflict

in

on China in the hearin gs,

concludes

to point

that

to China.

had initiated

reforms,

it

policies

If,

supposed
.

inade-

At the end of

were in no mood to send

as Marshal l had suggested,

}ao Tse-tung's

would not have won him such powerful
When the cabinet

decided

the

was easy enou h for

out in retrospect

the Americ n people

, more troops

.

its

with the Formosan

relations

in the administration's

World War II,

peasants

which followed

Korean peninsu la.'

the Republicans·
quacies

the outcry

sending

rom the discussions
writer

on the "China White

were in power and the scene

the nearby

in Greece,
different
.1

program of land
support

Chiang
reforms

rom the

to send Marshall

to

1~
., p . 1803.
In bis testimony Marshall
agreed
with·Acheson
on t he difficulty
of supporting
Chiang (ibid .,
p . 48?) . Wedemeyer testified
that the Nationalists
couici
if they had had mor e
have he ld the Yangtze with broomsticks
spirit
and less corruption,
although he complained that our
lack o.f moral support and · our overemphasis
on his weaknes s
harmed Chiang(~
., pp . 2327-28).

2New York Ti!!.!fil!
, June 5, 1951.
3Aeheson explained
his use in 194-9 of the "dust
se ttling"
term as meaning that he could not see what the
out c ome in China would be until the situation
had become
clear ( flilitary
Sit~ation ... in t ~e Par East, p . 1?26) •
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conciliate
there

the warring

se med no other

withdrawal

or all-out

factions
alternative

tacked

'edemeyer or Hurley,

in 1946, although

the public
In short,
military

Indeed,

thi

war.

of the Communist Chi nese at
:Republicans

could have at-

who had no effective

solution

would not have lad the impact

which criticizing
post-war

it was because

to thos e of complete

help for a full-scale

Few saw the importance
the end of the war .

in China,

Department

did.

China was an area where neither

the

nor the civilian

the State

on

could formulate

a policy

which

would work to our advantage , because they could not work
togeter

with the knowledge

back any decision , whatever

that

the American people

it might be .

would

CHAPTERIII
THE KOREAN WAR

Postwar
After
lished

Korea

World Wa:r II both the Republic

in the South under the sponsorship

Nations,

and the Democratic

the North claimed

Korea .
The Joint

Commission established

men~ could find
not agree

no

government

the United

in 1946 to set up a govern ...
since

the Russians

democracy advocated

taneous

withdrawal

powers .

the Russians

the Soviet

authorizing

gration

Union proposed
forces

proposal,

of Korean farces

The General

but passed

of the country
.

to

the simul-

hich

Communist govAssembly

a resolution

a Commission on Korea to use its
about unification

the

of the occupying

had formed a solidly

and army in North Korea .

rejected

to bring

impasse,

of Korean independence

The Soviet
of military

would

the Americans .

by

This idea was opposed by the United States,

knew that
ernment

took the question

Nations .

of

international

When no way could be found out of the ensuing
United.States

0£ all

to the problem of Korea .

to operate,

wa:y

to the full

of Korea in

in 1945 a four-power

was seen as a solution

estab-

of the United

People ' s Republic

to be the sovereign

At a conference

trusteeship

of Korea,

good offices

and an inte-

Ho~ever, when the Commission

. ..,3
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decided

to contact

to effectuate

leading

persons

a settlement,

it

was unsuccessful,

South Sj,~ngman .Rhee was unwilling

group make _sug 3estions

in North Korea to try

that

the

on the development

and in the

United

Nations

or · a more repre-

sent at ive government . 1
.The ~T
nited

to evacuate
to do so.
troops

their

Nations

troops

The Joint

requested

Americans

irom Korea.

and Russians

The .Americans agreed

Chiefs

of .ta.ff believed that
were needed elsewhere., 2 and some officers,

ing Genera l MacArthur,

Korea particularly

did not consider

threatening

at this

the
includ-

the situation

time.3

in

By remuv:!.ng

1Leland Goodrich, Kore : A Studz of U.S . Policy in
the United Nations, Counc!ron
Foreign Relations•
New York1
1956, pp . ?~-76.
2Militarz
Situation
in the Far Easti p. 1811 . Testimony of Dean Acheson . George Marshall te st ified that the
Joint

Chie.fs

of Staff

found

it

d.;1.fficult

to fully

guard

the

airstrips
in Alaska, while the u. s . occupation
force in
Japan was at only sixty per cent of strength (ibid.,
p. 382).

-

3!bid., pp. 2167-68 . Some warninge were given , nevertheless,
of the danger in Korea.
According to Sen . Harry
F. Byrd , Lt. Gen . John Hodges,. commat1_der of t he occupation
forces,
had declared
before the Armed Servi ces Committee in
February 194? that under conditions
existing
at the time
the North Koreans w-0uld dominate South Koreans ii' the U. s.
troops were to withdraw (ib~ ;' p . 2008).
After his 194?
trip to China, General Wedemeyer was i nstr ucted to proc feed
to Korea and to report on conditions
there.
He recommended
that the United States organize a..d equip a South Korean
scout force to resist
any attack .from the North, for unless
.America gave assistance,
a rorth Korean occup tion of the
whole peninsula
could be predicted
(ibid.,
p . 1988). 'h is
part of tbe 194? 1edemeyer report wabOt
made public,
&Ceo
cording
to Se cretary
of State
Acheson;
because certain
statements
therein
might have caused a break of harmony :u,
certain
quarters
(ibid.,
p . 1987).
Acheson maintained,
however, that General Wedemeyer had agreed to the de cision
to withdraw on the basis of a need for economy.
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our army we could hope to prevent
sula*

a stru ggle in the penina poor place to .fi ght. 1

which was str ate gically

Also, pressure
Korea ♦.

for a spe edy withdrawal

Nations

Commiss ion reported

of all

Unite d States

Military

Advisory

ficers.

The Commission was unable

Soviet

forces

Union had carried

between

Nations

out its

The United

·MacArthur,

equipment

States

tacking

of the country,

force. 4

In January

Still,

a lar ee part
since

in strengthenccording

had left

sufficient
forces;

to stop a ·well-equipped
1950 our military
almost

to

it

at-

mis sion
11,000.000

and at t he time of the June inva-

of the equipment

was bein g shipped.

t he equip ment had to come from new procurement

~_!bid.,

-

alon g the fron-

observers

Korean security

si gned an agre ement with Korea for

sion

con-

the United

t han militarily.

r·orth

suf f icient

goods,

of military

was more interested

hoiever,

worth of military

the

announced withdra wal by

American troops

be llind to stop

was not,

a

and t he oouth. 3

in g South Korea eaono.mically
General

whether

to verify

t he use of trained

betwe en t he North

!or

hundred men and of-

' o les s en the possibility

t he two s ections

planned

an evacuation

Jul y 27, 1949, except

by

Group of about five

the end of 1948.

tier

by South

2

The United

flict

was exerted

z!liiid,,
3coodrich,

p. 7.53'.,, General
p.

.Bradleyi

s testimony.

243,. MacArthur• s testimony ·.
pp. 78-79.

~Militarl._§_lluation

in the Far East,

p. 2L1-3.
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or from partly

stocks,

there

was some difficulty

the program und er way, and neither

i n getting

sources

depleted

could have been satisfactorily

of these

tapped in the ninety

days between the working out of the program in March and
the June invasion. 1
The United
making clear

occurred
support
State

States

what it. would do if

and also for its
to the Pr esident

an attack

both for not
from .North

to give adequate military
of South Korea . 2 Secretary of

in reference

rea. in a .speech before

had been speaking

were stationed
to other

guarantee

of the Paci.fie,
t hese areas

t ha t th} initial

reliance

di genous people .
oft

the United

--

1 Ibid.,

that

of areas

in this

where United

These areas

e entire

rations

defence
could

civilized

which so far

military

speech

he

States

troops

In referring

he had stated

against
!or

of Ko-

Press Club on January

and which they had to defend .

re gions

mitments

the National

mainly

the indecision

to the protection

Mr. Acheson emphasized

12, 1950.

Korea

failure

Dean Acheson was ac cused of revealing

of the United States

could

had been criticized

that
attack,

must rest
then count

no one
but

on the

in-

on "the- com•

world under the Charter
has not proved

pp. 1837 and 1993~34, Acheson•s

of

a weak reed
testi

mony.

2 In view of the poor training
and morale of the South
Koreans, it remained questionable
from evidence presented
in t he hearings
whether more aid would have helped the Koreans (ibid.,
pp . 243 1 2114-15, 3384-85) . Senator Greene
poi ntedtc)the
fear of some authorities
that President
Rhee
would use armaments te amount an attack against North Korea
as a reason for not tendering
more aid (!!?!2,., p. 2114) .
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to lean on by any people
their

independence

who are determined

against

outside

Dean Acheson quoted parts
then Con$ultant

Dulles,

the National

to protect
. 111

aggression

of a speach by John Foster

to the Secretary

of State , before

of Korea on June 19,

Assembly of the Republic

·1950. to show that we never adopted a policy
Korea .

After

telling

give you their

the Koreans

support,

with your own respect
efforts
all

, u Dulles

nations

against

already
late

and primary

It

that

however.,

to attack

to be a deterrent

was five

days

would occur?

nrequires

that

? orth

this

independKoreans

were

speech came too

factor .
of South Korea

after

Dulles ,.•',' speech

Koreans attacked . lhat evidence
invasion

or political

and that

Invasion
It

upon your own

the United Nations

inte grity

is probable,

preparing

dependence

consistent

from any threat . or use .of force

your territorial

ence ., 02

"the American people ·

both moral and material,

emphasized

to refrain

that

of abandoning

The Far

had there
'astern

that

the North

been that

this

Command, the Central

1Ibid ., pp . 1?40-41 and 1811-12 . In their

book The
General-and the President
and the Future of American Jorei~n :Polle~ (Ifew York : Farrarr Straus , anci Young, 'Ig51) p .
Io , Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. express
the opinion that Aeheson's statements
were .foolish in inviting
aggression.
On the other
hand , alber _Millis
thinks
that Acheson could hardly have stated otherwise,
sina~
.American troops had been withdrawn £rom Korea (~sand
the
State : Civil-Militar
Elements · in N ,tional PoliC:
New
ork:

Council on ·•o""eign
2 Military
Situation

Relations,

1956 , p. 260 .

in t he Far East,

PP• 2020-22.
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Intelli

gence Agency,

sibility

and other

of an offensive,

The administration

but one die

believed

far from exhausted
.

war.fare,

these

political

methods

since

1950, from General
the Soviet

instead

Acheson quoted

Soubh Korea .

at t ention
.

definite

warning

summer.

that

Also,

over part s

well guarded before
did st ate,

Bridges

claimed

a large

previous

had been received

t hat this

would be no civil
unfulfilled

as early

sha:-e
this

was a

, A.ehe-son responded

Command had not believed

there

mov:ing

however ., that

might divert

of tbe coming -attack

the Far East

had reported

report,

to South Korea and might even invade

When Senator

territory

to take

mili-

of March 10,

to this

attempt

The report

g overt

a report

Mac Arthur . - According

Union would probably

as

they would probably

of undertakin

if checke d in t hese areas , Russia

that

and psy-

, and intimidation

pressure

of South e ast Asia which were less

of its

the Communists had

of guerilla

objectives,

Secretary

action .

against

not seem imminent .

the possibilities

means of obt ai ni ng their

tary

that

the pos-

.

cbological

continue

grou ps had reported

the statement

war in Korea that

reports

as October

and

Oll' invasion

1949 . 1

About 9:30 P . M. on June 24 Ambassador John Muccio
informed

Washington

South Korea .

North

On the morning

dor to the United
of the Security

that

Nations

Council.

had invaded

of the twenty - fifth

Ernest
With

Korean forces

Gross
Russia

requested
absent

, Ambassa -

a meeting

in protest

----------------------------1

~

. , PP • 230-31 .
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over Uni t ed Nations

ve.fusal

of Communist China,

the Council

claring

that

ing for

the North Koreans

lution

also

a breach

ealled

to cease

tried

hostilities.

to determine

the Korean fi ghting

with his advisers.

de-

and call1 The reso-

ev ery a s sist from assisting

only after

Testimony
of Defense;

others

were pr e se n t at the Blair

the Joint

on how to meet the threat

~f Defense

oppose doing

Pr esi dent
to

deliberations

t he Secretary

Chiefs

of

of Staff,

and

House meetin gs when deciin Korea were made . 3

Joh ns on testi!ied,

not recommend goin g into
officials

careful

showed that

Secretary

Secretary

whether

to commit. ground troops

Stane,

the military

As
did

did any o! the
so when they had the ch ance . 4 NeiKorea,

t her did me!Ilbers of Co . ress

but neither

when they knew wh at American

would be.
At a Blair

House meeting

move th e Sevent h Fleet
and air

.forces

tionals,

East,

had occurred

members to render

Truman had made the decision

actio

a resolution

Nati ons and to refrain

Some Senators

sions

a representative

Koreans . 2

the North

enter

adopted

0£ the peace

on all

ance to th e United

to reco gnize

to t he Formosa Straits,

t,o protect

and to furnish
1ooo drich,
p . 1211 .

2 !lli.,
4

~.,

p.

t he evacuation

to

to use naval

of American

arms to the Republic

na-

of Korea .

The

and Militacy
Situation
in t he Far
read this resolution
to the Senat ors .

p . 106,
Marshall

P• 361.

on June 26 it was decided

3~

2585; cf,

. , PP• 2572-7 6 ,.

Bradley ' s testi

mony, pp . 933•34 .
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Truman reported

next day President
ing the Security
assistance

Council

in a.topping

call
the

to Congress

that

follow-

upon members to render

aggression,

every

he ha.d ordered

United

States

air and sea units to give Korean troops cover and
o! June authorization
was
support. 1 On the twenty-ninth
given

to extend

operations

to North Korea; but only i.f this.

were necessary

to .~omplete

South

Koreans ·and of retaining

of l orth

the mission ' of clearing
a port

the
base

and ai~

in the area of Pusan . 2
General

MacArthur informed

of the confusion
served

or th

of the Korean battle

had been abandoned or lost .

line

ground troops . 3 There.fore,

area .

It was possible

the North Koreans could break through .
ing of the Han River

Chie.fs of Staff

South Korean Army, which he ob-

on a reconnaissanee

equipment

the Joint

In fact,

could be assured

Much
that

the hold-

only by using

'General MacArthur advised

the

1 Ibid.,
pp . 933~'4, 991- 92. In reality,
the ecurity
Council-ala
not meet until several hours a!'ter Truman ' s
later when it adopted a u.s.
announcement, an-d it was still
draft resolution
recommending assistance .
2 rbid . , p . 536-, Marshall's
testimony;
also, P• 934-,
.
Bradley~estimony
.

3~t,

p . 1112 and 235. General ' edemeyer testif'ied
that be would not have sent ground troops into Korea; never theless,
he is careful
to point out that he migpt not be
able to pass a competent judgment on this question,
as he
had not been in Korea and did not know all the details
(ibid . , pp . 2307-08)

t!i'irt

,

On the

he maintained
in taking
a£firm ot communism .
e had to do

other . hand,

he 'government. was "absolutely

correct

ative steps
ainst
the advance
it some place and the time was already overdue, • • •• (fil9_.
p . 2315) . u Admiral Sherman also stated
that he thought
the d_eci.sion to commit ground troops was sound , altho ug h he
had had apprehensione
at the time (!R~•• P• 1651) .
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Joint

Chiefs•

i.f so authorized,

an American regimental
the nuoleus

Japan .

.for a poe -sible

build

with his mission
Nor hern troops. 1

the action
by the

It recommended that
forces

available
to carry

was created

sidered

his connection
since

the Chiefs
State

l
2

leader .

make

.

.ao-

Although

the appointee

control

of his

and even his reports

According

bis

eon-

be!ore

command came from
were sent

being

to MacArthur,

to the

.forwarded

to

the

he had no direct

with the United nations.2
military

whether
be saved.

~--

strategy
mentioned

an y remnants

At the

time

p . 1112, Bradley's

Ibid.,

Couneil .

with the United Nati.on.a as largely

the Korean War, MacArthur

Army eould

Security

into

command under American direc•

by the world body,

of Staff

In outlining

at first

ground troops

United Nations

as the military

the entire

Nations.

connection

1cal

of sending

and Dei'ense Departments

United

South Korea ot

out the June 25 and 2? resolutions

position

in

Aotion in Korea

to a unified

was designa.te4

fr-om

feasible

members o:f the United Nations

Arthur

nominal,

offensive

ot clearing

Collective

Korea was affirmed

to move

up et two di visions

Tbis would make an early

On July?

he intended

combat _ team to the combat area as

accordance

tion

that

P• 10 .

at the beginning
that

or the
o:t the

it

was problemat-

South Korean
invasion,

testimony .

of

the
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Joint

Chiefs

had underestimated

the number, equipment,

of the North Koreans . 1

ability
burdened

be-cause of logistic

of supplies

allel,

and

While South Koreans were

mis takes

quipm nt close

the in ~aders

and

in the arrangement

to the thirty-:eigbth

had been trained

par-

well. 2

and disciplined

To aid the South Koreans , America could contri bute immed~
iately

only tbe .four divisions

MacArthur believed

these

out combat experience,
isation,which

troops
in spite

a _beachhead

in two -battalions
nificent

of some defects

in organ-

at economy.-'

"ere encount .ered in estab-

near Pusan, MacArthur managed to put

of infantry

resistance"

amphibious

Army in Japan.

to be as good as any with-

could be blamed on efforts

Although many problems
lishing

o! the Eighth

.

These troops

bei oo destroyed .

before

landir...g at Inchon surprised

September 15, the United Nations

forces

put up a "magAfter

an

the North Koreans on

were able to ad-

vance . 4

A few weeks later

they neared

the thirty-eighth

parallel,

and the question

of crossing

into

confronted

north

the

Allied

leaders

.

General Mac rthur

submitted

of the parallel

The Eighth

the western

coastal

.

his plan for operations
Army was to attack

area while the Unit ed States

Corps at Wonsan was to make an amphibious

idea.
id~a,
2661).

1~

.,

2~

. , PP• 230-31.

4 Ib!d,.,

North Korea

p . 948.

Bra dley's

pp ., 231-32 .

:;~

testimony

landing

along

Tenth
on the

.

•t P• 237.

landing was MacArthur 0 s
Louis Johnson testified
that Collins had opposed the
p.
at:id Admiral Sherman had had reservations
. (ib!d.,
The Inchon
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CC)aat of North Ko:rea. 1

eastern

Chie f $ approved Mae.Art hur's

On September 29 the Joint

plan,

however, some

including,

restrictions

on just how violent the att ack ag ainst Nor t h
Korea should be . 2 Becau$e of serious political
implica·O! such an action, : no all-out

tions

bomb attack,

at t ack agains t Pyongyang and simi lar
authorized
Sta-ff .

without

Collins.

tion

this

ot her countries

efforts

For this

reason

orders

o!
we

have to b~
that

ot the parallel,

north

would be taken not to do any t hing likely

the conflict.

Chiefs

was beeause

which would later

wished to avoid bombing cities
rebuilt . 3 We had also assured
out military

should be

cl earance with the Joint

prior

Accordin g to General

carrying

tar gets,

any

nor

in
cau -

to extend

had been sent

that

United

Nati ons tro -ops were not

to cross

t he Manehurian

border

under any circ umstances

and that

no non- Kor ean fore .es

shc,)uld be used

in t h e prov:inc~s

bordering

t be Soviet

Union

and Manchuria . 4
On October
of the parallel
a resolution

7,

United Nations

was obtained
that

the pacification

when Great Britain

:tntroduced

in Korea should proceed with
and unification
o! all o! Korea. 5 The

l
· Ib~d . t P • ?19 .
4

of the aross1:ng

the forees

JCS we-re then authorized

3~

support

to direct
2

General

Mae.Arthur to

. ·
Ibid.,
PP • 245 and 340 .

- - pp . 1362-6~ .

Ioid. , , P• 1230•

testimony

ot General Collins .

5roid . • PP • 2698 and :;171. Accordi ng to the New York
Times o:f'October 8 1 1950, troops cro$Sed the paralleI at
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plan for the possible
execute

such plans

In the event

occupation

only with the approval

General

no ground operations

north

and naval

should

by

operations

of the President.

troops

of the parallel;

however,

not be disco ntinue~ .

Union and t he Chinese

came south

not permit

of the parallel,

itself

military

General
action

chance of successful
On October
comm.anders that
the forces

Communists.

Final

ture

all

that

Unit ed Nations

was a reasonable

restrictions

on movement of

Korea and was authorizing

of the territory,
forces

to con-

MacArthur inforroeo. the field

he was lifting

in North

would

war with

was authorized

as lon g as there
1
resistance.

de-

actions

the United States

MacArthur

24• General

air

If Chinese

to become engaged in a general

Communist China.

or Chi•

MacArthur should undertake

would have to be made in view of possible

the Soviet

tinue

but to

o.f North Korea by Soviet

of occupation

nese Communist force$,

cisions

o.f North Korea,

He cautioned,
other

them to cap-

nevertheles

than South Korean

st
should

3:14 A.,M. EST on October 7. This was before the General
Assembly had approved the resolution.
MacArthur stated
he had ample justifi~
that on tle basis of this resolution
cation for crossing the border between North and South Korea (ibid ., p. 245 i cf. General Bradley• s testimony, . !lli• t
P• 98.,,,-r;- .
1 Ibid.,
p. 718.
Read by Senator Morse from 'the document ''Joint
Cbie.fs of Stat! Report for Senate Committees
on Korean Operations . 0 Accordin g to Millis,
p. 27, this
directive
placed responsibility
ror decisions
on MacArthur
which should have been made in Washington.
If Washington
was ready to send troops into North Korea, it should have
been prepared to meet possible
consequences.
And yet orders
for the possibility
of Chi.!ailed to provide specifically
nese intervention.
·
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be withdrawn
Korean

units

advised

.

with tDeir
close

~ashington

troops

before

Chief ·s o.t: Sta.ff

Joint

of this

of not allowinE non-Koreans
As General

Yalu .

been plenty

inform

by

Commander of the inconsistency

policy

to the

r..ad

there

and be supplanted

On t he same day the

the .,,ar :Sast

order
area

us soon as feasible

of time

for

in the

pointed

out,

MacArthur to wire

and

Collins

of his opinion

on the disposition
orders. 1

these

giving

of

The Communist Chinese Invasion
Did General
Chinese
lull

invasion

Mac rthur
into

in the fighting,

have adequate

North Korea?

warning

Wby did he , during

launch. an o•.ffensive

intervention?

mid-October

between President

Commander-in-Chief
possibility

"there
drive

they

Chinese

or Soviet

troops,

south to Pyongyang .
effectively

on Wake Island

ManArthur 's opinion
intervention.

in

but without

air

slaughtern

force
if

of the

or sixty

support

they tried

He could not picture

working with Chinese

the

His answer

might be able to send in fifty

would be tbe greatest

planes

led to mass

ruman and the General,

had requested

of Chinese

had been that
thousand

At a conference

a

on November 24

which was to end the war, but which instead
Chinese

of the

to

Russian

grotind troops. 2

1Militar~Situation
in the Far Bas~, p. 1240 . When
questioned by ~rse
on whether the JCS were in a good position to pass judgment on military
tactics
with the aid of
terrain
maps , Collins answered in the afiirmative
(~.,
pp. 1300 and 1312-13).
2

Truman, p. ?566.
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t he hea.rin r,s Hae .Arthur

During

led ge of Chinese
Communists

power wt.en he stated

had collected

lar ge forces

f··y own reconnaissance,

to Korea;

but

you understand,

t he g eneral

from China and other

of troops . lt1

sources,

previously

nations

entirely

wl' · ch was

&.vailable,

or

a Chinese

dor at Peiping

of China ' s threat

i.f t h e United

Natiot1s

.forces

the thre atened
troops

Sou th Korean

warnin B could
officials.
primarily

have

·ell

First,

troop
of Korea in

of that

month

Communist interv e tion

gave warnings .
Minister

came from Chinese
in t i1eir

On October

informed

estimate

the Indian

to send troops

crossed

AmbassaKorea

into
.

Never-

was 1ot to be carried
ird~o

""
forth

been view ed with

.2

3 th~ Chi -

cros eed t h e parallel

action

Fiver .

was limited

mistaken

Foreign

ested

t he Yalu

o! China in the direction

of. possible

Chi neee

lar ge accumulations

known

nese Communist

ican

along

some of t..,es e reports

However,

Other

only

"the

From a bout the twenty - seventh

Nationalist

t heless,

that,

indicated

He had certainly

more and more evidence

came in.

in J orm ation

places,

movement up the coast

September.

s pok e of some know-

out i.f

Korea.

This

s cepticism

by Amer-

the Communists mi Jht have been inteF -

in influencing

the United

Nations,

for

on

1~U i tary Si tuationJ .~ the Ff E~st, p._1a . · While
speaking of the difiieu ! ty of knowing in Washin g ton what
happen d bRtween November 6 and the full invasion
of the
twentyusixth,
General
Bradley
said that much o:f the intelligence
lackin g to the JCS should have come fro.c1 MacArthur's
own :field command . Even though the gromad w.as hea vily
wooc,ied and troops were diffic ult 'tio see, a concentration
of . force
on the right .flank of the Ei ghth Army should have
been picked up by air and naval reconnaissance
(~.
~P.vl0;6}

2~

.,

p . 1234;

testimony

of General

Collins

.
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October

4 the Politice.l

of the General

Committee

was to vote on a resolution.calling

Indian

.Ambassador

nev er materialized
Although
October

Chinese

there

' H:lS

However,

tile

had be.fore

for

of att;aoks

warned

the first

Chinese

prisoner

intervention

evidence

to the United

I'ia.tions

with Chinese

reporti

submitted

ng his

inti mida ti on and diplomatic

a United

be i ncreasing

China in becoming involved
position

was th ought the Chinese

a special
"in

hos-

uJl.its o11 3

On

the parallel
that

Nations

t he Chi -

withdrawal

by

mean~, and th at .only if these
intervention

hearin gs, Acheson spoke oi the lack

in her international

:forces

Communist mi l itary

nese obj ect ive was to obtain

would there

possibility,

t. e vi ew in Washington

was still

that

to be posi t~ve of it .

Nove mber 24, when a mass movement across

£ailed

was captu r ed on

was a distinct

the very next day the General

occu rred ~ it

had

as November 4 MacArt ur reported

not sufl'ieient

contact

which

.2

26• a s late

while

report

steps to en.sure
y throu .shout Korea. 1 B ..J ond, t he

of stabilit

conditions

As s embly

of real

.

4

During

the

adYanta ge to

and t 11e l os s she would sustain
in doing

so as reasons

Communists would not intervene

why i t

.5

2Rovere and Schlesi ger , p . 148 . During the hearings ,
Ma.c Arttur
claimed
t ,,t- he had received
no of .ficial -notifica
tion of t his warning by the Chinese , that all he knew was
g leaned .from readin g t he newspapers (Militar1
Situatio!L!!!
the Far East , p . 109).

3Ibid • t P• 1833.

-

5Ibid.,

p . 2101 .
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I

The authore
quite

severe

of The G~neral and the President

are

not making

better

on General

MacArthur !or

of the intelligence

he had.

Chinese

encountered

in late

authors

accused

intervention,

early

of making light

even reporting

were identified

to the authors,
just

why General

November, the
of the Chinese

from ~okyc on the day eight

it

ther · was
as a 1'aot~ 1

in Korea that

evidence. to accept the invasion

insufficient

hearings

showing tbe number of

O tob rand

the general

Chinese divisions

According

After

use

a puz~le after

was still

MacArthur launched

the

an offensive

on. November 24 with .forces he knew to be .in£ rior in numbers to the Communists. 2 Perhaps he believed that the Chinese would back down if he were firm,
have considered

a holding

and, too,

he might

back under the circumstances

as

a sign o! weakness • .3
In supporting

his advance at the end of November,

MacArthur explained:

Now wha't we actually did was to move forward to ascertain
in strength of the enemy'•
forces.
When w& moved forward~ I had already prepared, and the troops had in their hands, the
order for retreat
if we found the enemy in
force.
What we did was really a reconnaissance
in force.
It was the only way we had to £ind
out what the enemy had and what his intentions

were.4

Ibis

assertion

-

eonfliets

ember 24 desori~tng

with

Military

, · acArthur'

the coming campaign

1Rovere and Schlesinger,
2
3Ibig.,
Ibid. 1 p. 152. .
4

·

s co mmunique' of Nov-

and ending

with the

pp. 135-36.
p.

140.

Situat4"9p in the Far East,

pp.

20-21.
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"If successful,

sentence:
purposes

end the war ••

declared

that

this
• •

should

£or all

practical

During the hearings,

tt

Collins

MacArthur

was "bent upon tho de,.. ruction
the North Korean forces." 1
Had the Far East

deployment
complete

of his

commander used poor judgment

tr oops in November?

coordination

of the Eighth

Corps under hi.s direction.

been somewhat worried

of the forces

b.efore t he Chinese

'.-1Lon

y if

t ho matter,

for

the Far Bast

ltJ1en

the terrain
advantage

directives.

Washington

after

did not pursue

the responsibility

the

first

Chinese

the separation

of

Army with the as s ertion

that

of any delay

in ~oordinatin

g activities

of the advanced

units

'I'he Far t a.st commander soon after1ttards
1

had asked

and

was t oo rugGed !or the enemy to be oble to take

demanded t he extrication
ines.

invasion

oommander supported

the Xth Corps from the E1ghth

Chiefs

about the disposition

was considered

commander. 2

of a theater

blows,

strategy

spoke of

, the Joint

he needed additional

he an swered in the negative,

in the

Army and the Xth

Nevertheless

had evidently

MacArthur politel

MacArthur

of

lli£ . ,

1

the JCS

of t he Mar ...
told

Collin s

p .• 1369 .

2 Ibid . , p . 246.

From hindsight,

Bradley

would

have

deployedtroops
a little
difierently,
although,
he admitted
MacArthur might have had some additional
information
which
· made him deploy

the~ troops

as b.e did

(ibid.,

p . 972).

li

.ac.Arthur had had this information,
it-rs-surprising
h~ had
not mentioned it.
As it was , he stated during the hearings
that ''the disposition
o! those troops ., in my opin1on, co uld
not nave been imp1·oved upon , had I known the Chinese were
g oin g to attack
(!!!!S •, P• 19) .li
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that

the restrictions

if

moved• maximum use made of

churia

recc.mnais s ance were re•

on air

N'ati onalists;

the Chinese

bombarded, and a -naval blockade

be willing

to reeombine

which he had conside .red

questioned

by

This was t he saine line
on tiovember 30 when

impractical

1

his superiora.

An Entirely

Whe:n 1t beeame obvious

New War

that

the Chinese

of the

United

riations

forces

oourse.s were open to the admiristration?
sional

ti.me discuss

st

predatory

attack

declaration,

0£ her forces

Collins

could not recall

be issued

Mill.is,

~~~i·tw

force of

the Far East oo~ander

to the Joint

to the Chinese •.,;

Chiefs

On the other

to replace
ing North Korea of enemy troops. 4

3Ibid

a. reasonable

to bring to an end the
on ours~" 2 In spite o! this

they gave him ao new directive

:1

China should

would be utilized

ever making a recommendation
ultimatum

that.

a cease ....
..fire order,. . - • , the entire

the United Nations

what

De.fore the congres-

if she did net witbin

that

it,

called

committees General MacArthur stated

have been warned

were invading

ttan entire l y new w~,"

in large numbers and had initiated
as the leader

mountedt he would

the Xth Corps with t.he Eighth

a.oroes Korea.

Army to hold a line

Man•

that

band,. ·

the one ot clear-

PP• 296-97 ·•
in the; Far Ea.s~, pp •. 29-30.

Situ~tion

. • P • 1261 .

4

Ibid .

t

P•

30.

an
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Nevertheless,
to solve
this

the Korean problem .

did have his own program

.

On

December:;

his army as qfacin g the entire

unde~lared

war • .u

is taken•

he continued•

tt

and steady

Collins

One or these was to continue
limitations

tions

Nations

on action

be justi ...

blockade

of China,

and no great
troops

which he saw a.a possible ..

attacks

with the txisting
on Manchurian bases,

no use of Nationalist

By doing

this,

however•

would be for ced out of Korea .
the light

This was the course

United Nations ~ commander .

Chinese

in the nUll!ber of United Na-

increase

in Korea) .

to the Army Chief

the fight

(no air

eould be to continue
tioflS.

cannot

to Korea to view the situa-

of Staf.f +:b~ee couraea of action

troops,

action

attrition

The Far East commander explained

no naval

in an

and immediate

"hope for success

sent General

Pre s ident

he des-

Chinese nation

some positive

at

leading to final destruction
can
be contemplated. 111 In light of tnis rep.art, the

reasonablf
tion .

"Unless

to Washington

His reports

time were very pessimistic

cribed

fied

the general

A seoond ehoioe

without

0£ action

the United

the above restric~
preferred

An armistice

by the

in which the Chi-

nese Communists agx-eed to remain north
par3llel

was t~e third

possible

of the 'thirty-eighth
aetion . 2

1 In the following month the idea of evacuation was
considered by .the military
in Washington . However, in view
or pessimistic
repat'ts
MacArthur was sending the JCS there
seems little
basis for his later statement that "the Joint
Chiefs of .Sta.ff were not sure we could stiek in Korea . It
was my opinion
p. uoo.

that

we eould. ,u

2Truman_, p. 41:5.

Quoted by Sen . Smith

(~.,
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President

Truman was concerned

tween the administration'
by the

commander . 1

look became more obvious

mid-December the United

fire.

ember 29 the Joint
directive,
After

Chiefs

mentioning

that

of providing

Mac .Arthur

that

in successive

troops

as your

Chinese

damage to hostile

positions,

In his reply

orders

of September

the impos-

Chiefs

was henceforth
subject

, inflicting

11

told
to be "to

to safety

he was to

15 .

appeared

stressing

the Joint

reasonable

of December

evacuation

that

a forced

fect

upon the peoples

-

and on Dec-

of your
as mue.h

. It The direc-

make advanced

opportunity

for

or-

2

evacuation.tt

of such action

that

a cease-

MacArthur a. new

in Korea as possible

o.f rthe) last

for

however,

sent

consideration

then went on to state

determination

setting

and after

directive

!orees

which advocated

Communist forces

more troops,

primary

intro-

advancing,
of Staff

In

a resolution

the basie

his basic

his basic

defend

derly

by India

of fo::-cing evacuation

sibility

in out-

which occurred

supported

to explore

thus replacing

capable

tive

Nations

The Communists kept

advocated

in December and January.

tates

committee

ideas

be -

This difference

in the exchanges

between Tokyo and '1!a-shington

up a three-man

~1nd these

a policy

United Nations•

duced in the United

at the distance

;o

General

1acArthur

ot Korea would have an adverse

of Asia and t bat the eventual

would call

held

£or even greater

forces

ef-

results
in the Far

l Ibid . , P• 416.

2~ilitary

~it~ation

in the Far East> pp . 1469, 2179-80.
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' ast.

He did not want to evacuate

mated that

he might be foreed

9 the

On January

that

these

~hich

rneasures

Joint

mi g ht

enlar g e the

He should,

cessive

posi ti.on s , inflicting

and his

came evident
losses

the r efo~e,

continually

basic

mission

of Sta!f

informed

to ret aliatory

conflict,

could

defend

.not

be re-

t he penin s ula in suc-

maxi oum damages on the ene my.

of protectin

material

the

amounting

keep in mind the sa.fety

th at evacuation

of men an

Chiefs

restrictions,

moved.

He should

to do so if he were not given

not removed.

on him wer

general

but i nti-

and if one or more of tho restrictions

· reinforcements
plaeed

his troops,

Japan.

was essential

or his

Only if
to avoid

was he to withdraw

troops
it

be-

severe

from the pen-

insula.1
On January
advisability
tioned

tical

10 General

of withdrawing

-:ac Arthur
fr om Korea,

reported

t l e military

althou gh he men-

political
~onsiderationn
might make it
to do so . 2 Two days later Tokyo headquarters

a report

that

from the JCS which General Mao rthur

as a possible

change in American policy

impracreceived

inte rp r ete d

and an agreement

2 His report stat.ed that uin t h e absen ce o!
political
considerations•
•• the command should
drawn from the peninsula
just as r apidly as it is
tactically
to o so . I.f, on the other hand, t he

in

ove riding
be with feasible
primary

political
i cterests
o.f the United States
in the Far ..t!,ast
lies in holding a position
in Korea and thus pinning down
a lar ge se gment of the Chinese military
potential , the military course is implicit
in political
polic y and e sho uld
be prepared
to ac c ept an y ,atte ndant •·haza r d - to Japa n ·• s secu.city and whatever c asualties
result ~~ibi<!,., p . 906 )."
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principle

to his proposals

on action

of eyaouation,

Faced with the possibility

had made several
sixteen

actions

Korea.

Included

against

studies

"it

to the Joint
eent

had been devis~d

suggested

0.r all-out
opposite,

to MacArthur

steps

among the troops

might n-eoess.itate

purpose

In addition,

to the ambiguity

of the study , General

lins

1 Ibid .

1

in case

up these

a low level

the

points

of more.le

contained

in the stated

She.rman characterized

Mae-..

However, any doubt in the
have been reraoved

when Generals Hoyt Vandenbe-rg.and Col-

went to Korea.

MacArthur that

statement

r,<iarsball indicated

mind of the Far Ea.st ccmmand$r should
this

with the

that the Joint Chiefs .favored these

measures as not unreasonable.

after

not indicate

the use of some 0£ the
in Korea were stabilized
.3

even i.f the situation

Artnur•Sc interpretation

shortly

did

from Korea, wouJ.d call

.

Pointing

Unfortunately,

·w-ere to be taken

for considet-ation

a.otions.

of

Although Bradley

war w-1th CJaina .• 2 General

evacuation

Chiefs.

agreed .

the sixteen

that

the loss

in Korea and again in

and st,,·-t .ed o!f

has been tentatively

o.f

were- the .tour sug estions

in t he sixteen

copy of the study

Chiefs

drawn up a list

which might be take.n to prevent

the December 30 report

how it

the Joint

and had finally

aade by Gen$ral Mae.Arthur to Collins

the

the Chinese.

Collins

tried

to make clear

the proposals . were only part
P • 106 .

During

the hearings

to General

of a study.
MacArthur

ad-

mitted tbai the paper had been sent .to him only for his
ini'ormation .
·
a~ . • , P• ?36 . 3!b!9:_• • P•· 334 •

a
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name which Mac Arthur himse l f had used when referring
. the hearin s. l
t hem in
6

13 President

January

On

i mportant

out lini

fr om t he message

cessity

for prudence

alienate

t he allies

ter

writing

ful

resistance

Truman sent a messa ge to Tokyo
factors

political

previous

of the

in taking
or extend

purposely

day .

He wrote

any actions
the area

omitted
of the

nt~e

which might

of hostilities

..

Af·-

oS t he deter r ent to c ommunism whic h a succ e ssin Korea would be, he maintained

thou gh it might be necess a r y to \./ithdraw

it should

to

be made c l ear that

t he course

th a t al '

fr om Korean soil,
was being

forced

.ne·eessity
and that we planned to rectify
us by military
situation
. 2 Understandably , neither
MacAJ:>thur nor the
ministration

wanted

to be blamed for

a with drawal

on
the
ad-

from the

peninsula .
evacuation

Fortunately,
According

to Collins,

situation

and .found United

tainin g their

was soon deemed unneoessary,

both he and MacArthur

position

.

Nations
On January

forces

At a meeting

Council

agreed

recommendations

on this

eff'ect

changed in the preceding
1

~

its

morale

same day t he National

to th e inadvisability

into

capable

since

week~

the

of main-

17 General Collins

found the Ei g th Army in good shape with
ing . '

reviewed

improvSecurity

of putti ng all

conditions

The military

the

in Korea had
situation

?, 1220 , and 2111 .
.. • pp . T:>

2 Ibid

. , p . 503.
o.f the messa ge .
3Ibid.,~•

General

Marshall

read a paraphrase

}24 ; test i ~ony of General

Marshall.

was
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beginning

to improve,

and during

tbe latter

a.ry the enemy was on the defensive,

and March United Nations
it was fortunately
courses

of action

unnecessary
outlined

As the military
tion

conferred

for a possible
ton,

General

offering

reveal

of Janu•

When during

February

maintained

in the Joint

the administra-

to establish

Without clearance

MacArthur issued

study~ 1

Chiefs'

improved,

governments

eease-fire.

the initiative,

to carry- out any of the

situation

with other

a statement

on March 24

and political
him from his

strategy

that

the

if the Communists did not come to

When ot .her statements
his disagreement

a basis

from Washing -

to con.fer with the enemy and inferring

war might be enlarged
terms..

forces

.half

of the general

continued

with the administration
, President

Truman decided

commands in the Ftu" Ea.st.

to

on military
to remove

CHAPTERIV
THE RECALL

MacArthur•s Return to the United States
When !n April
United

States,

bad received

the Atlantic

protest

against

Senate

hearings

iatrati

ve o.fficials

action .

the removal

officers,

it

since

Lindbergh's

reception.

Senators

t

reasons

to pinpoint

tried

Senators

A storm of

the

the

admin-

President

Truman

of personal

prejudice.

of both military

soon became clear

During

to prove that

and because

from testimony

greater

questioned
for

to the

flight

aro -se immedie_tely.

in May and June

precipitously

Nevertheless,

him an acclaim

and subsequent

Republican

had acted

accorded

Americans

than any citizen

across

1951 Douglas MacArthur returned

that

all

's

and. politieal

had agreed to the

wisdom of Truman•s move.
On April 6t 1951, the President
meeting

to discuss

a letter

had eallea

from MacArthur to Republican

Congressman Joseph Mart in.

The chief

made up his mind to dismiss

the general,

_opinions

ment.

of his chief

Present

Mars ha ll,

advisers

before

executive

and Averell
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had already

but wanted the

making a:ny announce-

at the meeting were Dean Aeheson,

Omar ra dley,

for a

Harriman.

eorge
The decision

58
to relieve

the com ander was unanimous.

Harriman the~ght
years

earlier,

that

an opinion

-·"

sible

Chiefs

of Staff

to leave

shared

after
with Washington. 1

were asked if it

t he general

the

the Army Frank Pace,
delivered

he had
When the

was militarily

f~a-

of

in charge of the occupation

dismissal

b ·oad-oast, taking

mercial

two

by Marshall

Japan while removing him from his Korean post,
that it was not. 2
News of

Averell

he should have been relieved

read MacArthur• s communications
Joint

In fact,

rea-ched

him

by

MacArthur

surprise

they agreed

over a com-

.. Secretary

oi'

who was then in Korea, was to have

the President's

messa ge to the general.

Because

of the breakdown of a power unit in Pusan, Pace could not
be reached.

fieials

Hearing of a possible

leak,

then announced t he dismissal.

a surprise

administration
The action

both to the American public

o.r-

came as

and to the person

most involved.:3
Issues

involved

of the greatest

in dismis s in g General

importance,

were

ran ging .from the power of the

President

as Commande~ in Chie!,

situation

in Japan,

a public

controversy

mony before

MacArthur

American security,

the

abroad ., to the possibility
of
in the United States . 4 In bis testi-

reaction

the committees,

General Bradley pointed
2

lb1d.,

PP• 345 and 740.

pp. 421 ~nd 1773•
p . 17?6• testimoey

of Marshall.

to
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three

military

MacArthur
by

should be relieved.t

public

statements

indicated
limit
fer

rea s ons for which the Joint

and official

the war to Korea.
him to earry

with

Washington

·tiate

directly

to try

he had failed

be.fore publishing
action

Third,

that

the civ111nn authority
1
militari.
Differing
Although his public
MacArthur

ministration

1

o! the country

North Korea• the Soviet
and of designs

to nego-

proposal

Ohie.fs

felt

must control

the

Views on Formesa
announcements

s dismissal,

he made .

pol-

them, .

1.n proposing

the J9int

his

first

came ove!.' an interpretation

put on a visit

to

the g<;werrunent was already

he knew that

neg(>tiationslJ

to

more difficult•

with the enemy and had made that

even though

aggression

Seeond,

he had ·

e.f December 6• 1950, to clear

he had. taken independent

son for

was that

would make it

'rhis

Also,

considering

of these

communica tions

out directives.

comply w~th a dfreetive

publie

believed

of sympathy with the decision

a lack

icy statements

The first

Chiefs

were the main rearift

w:i.th the

.which the world

Aft-er the Jup.e invasion

Union accused
on Formosa .

ad-

from

the United States

of

In July MacArthur

1 Ibid . • PP·• 878-79.
Marshall also emph~sized the reso! the JCS, the Secretary o! Defense, and the
ponsibility
President,
who have an overall view of the objectives
of the
nation,
to determine
where the main threat
1ies,
where we
must fight holding actions,
and where we must ga'in time to
grow stronger.
He added, "What is new and what has brought
about the necessity
for General MacArthur'"' .temoval is th o
wholly unprecedented
situation
of a local theater
commander
publicly
expressing
his displeasure
at and his disagreement
policy of the United States ,
with the foreign and rnilitary
(ibid.,
P• 325h"

-
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let

Washington

under

this

know of his

his command.

plan

Because

other

as a preparation

visit

attack

against

gested

to the Far East

to inspect

c ommander that
situation

spite

of this

suggestion,

the general

visit

received

much publicity

a directive
policy

of preventing

and would be obedient

sent

Averell

pliance.
mained

dubious

of Mac .Arth ur's

policy.

The general

from the President
a statement

o.n Formosa . 3
on August
tacking

.from attackin
that
the

administ

g the

r ation

his com-

Harriman

acceptance

re-

o! adminis-

even advanced his readiness

to

problems,

but only if given further
orders
permitting
him to do so . 2 Truman soon

that

he and the

It was quickly

general

se en that

this

12 the Far Ea.st C@mmander issued
those

States

he understood

the gene ral,

full

and was

him oi.' the United

to the directive,

with

His

J ohnson dispatched

an swered

gen eral

conferring

de.al with policy

i.ssued

Louis

Harriman to the Far East to ensure

After

trative

went himse lf.

a change in United

the Generalissimo

.Al thou gh the

mainland .

ant to send
island . 1 In

on the

reminding

sug-

he might

foreshadowing

to MacArthur

in an

of Sta.ff

in the world press

In view of this,

policy .

interpret

Chiefs

the.Joint

to view the

States

might

to help the Formosans

the mainland,

as possibly

now

countries

a subordinate

interpreted

Formosa,

in t tie past

who "invariably

saw _«eye to eyeu

was not so when
a statement

at-

have - propag a ndized

---·---------------------------1-!QJ!! • )· p.

173.

2

Millis

t

PP • 268·- 69 .
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a policy

and appeasement

of de featism

who were now misrepresenting
the American people

in the Paci.f'icu

his trip

to Formosa.

would not "be misled

and

He hoped

s ly insinuation•

by

and bold misst atements inva.r.iably attrito anonymous sources." 1 Many saw this as an attack

brash

speculations,

buted
against

the Truman 4dministration.

His dise. gr eeraent 'A'ith the administration
again in August
the Veterans
were still

in a message he prepared

of Forei gn Jars .

Allies

might s pr ead.

alleviated

by-,_MacArthur

that

existed

there

This fear
al~egi

an island

belligerent

tenor

Presid ent .

He thus requested

Unfortunately,
already

chain,

the of£ice

Nations

not be

message,

supposedly

including

wi th air

power every

to Singapore ...

the general

0£ the Far East

• •

The

and disturbed
to withdraw

the

it.

Commander had

which , subsequently

a copy to the press

in two popular

to

the Kor ean

,as he did in this

of the .speech surprised

submitted

appeared

that

would certainly

Formosa , from which "we can dominate
Asiat ic port- from Vladivostok

for delivery

in the United

nervo us over the pos .sibility

conflict

appeared

magazines.3

The December 6 Directive
No dissonance
discernible

from A.Y.gust to November,

1 r.iiillis,

p.

2t-Ulitarl
3rbid.,

Collinsarui

between Mac.Arthur and t h& President
during

which time they

270.

Si ,uation

in the Far East,

PP• 121? and 200;.
Dean Acheson.

Testimony

was

p. 2002.
of General
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met on the island

of "ake .

nese Communist attack
Arthur made several
reoent
sent

strategy.

at the end of November, General
statements

attempting

to MacArthur requesting

by officials

sponsibility

that

were made short

the JCS bad suggested
the possibility

limiting

contact

cap to effective

zone .

pursuit

more active
tration.

1

of Chinese

lar ge forces

and

operations~ ·.,
without

precedent

in history•"

frank answer . 2
appeared

in the press

Attle ·e was in Washington

war.

MacArthur's

statements

campaign thus greatly

issued

a directive

-

P • 34-9:,•.

Ibid .,

"Are the limitations

military

Consequently,

Chiefs

News

bases re garded by you as a handi-

These statements
of a limited

of United States

on their

"An enormous handicap,

was MacArthur•s

reply

with the Chinese and

MacArt~'lur was asked,

attack

halt

to the anonymous gos -

In an exchange with the editors

unlimited

any

re- •-

Yet only six days previously

0£ a neutral

and World Report,

to accept

MacJ.+thur • s remarkable

whatsoever
1

sip to which you re!er."

Prime Minister

his

his comment on

of his command if

o.£· the Yalu.

was , nThere is no validity

unlimited

Mac.,..

to ju.stify

he had re.fused

for the security

which prevent

tl:le massive Chi-

Arthur Krock of the New York Times had

a telegram

statements

However, after

at a time when

speaking

calling

embarrassed

in favor

for a

the adminis-

on December 6• 1950, the Joint
to all

t heater

commanders
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ordering

them to exercise

menta.,

They should

eerning _.military

releasing

that

of State

MacArthur pointedly

announcement .for approval,

asserted

at Far East headquarters

preted

mal public

Washin gton informed him

change

the

in reports
withstand

greater

Meanwhile;

to the Joint

the

Chiefs

to .for•

line

the Chinese hordes unless
.fo_peeagainst them. 3

1

this

However, the Joint
. , P• 442 - (see

to

to

Korea b:}r stating

given permission

to use

Matters

testimony

that

$Oldier than himself .

was true

in the military

G,b,i.e.ts did not believe

this

to

appendix).

!rom a quot•tion

:,~p:t'a, PP• 50-,3,.

months later

he might not 'be able ·to

i:a his

there never was a more .subordinate

2 Ibi,d. ,. p . 417;

in

Opinion on Military

4f

As :Bradley would stre.ss

several

he had been trying

that

General MacArthur declared

1~

solety

state .meuts contrary

released

of holding

Di!ferenee~

sphere.

ve was inter-

as applying

It was not until

policy .

policy

Whitney

and not to comrouniJ1ues • correspondence,

MacArthur actually

administration

General

,

sta:tements

and conversation . 2

con-

submit t ed his nex t

the December 6 directi

that

foreign

and statement1'

such communiques need not be cleared.

later

that

publi.c state-

with the Department of Defense be-

policy
them~ 1

When General

routine

in their

el ear ,any mess-age concerning

with the Departm•nt

policy

fore

caution

read

by Senator

Wiley.
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true

in the realm of public

announced policy
Collins

tive

when he sent

Yalu without

because

American troops

so advising

0£ the military

on the territory
opinion
tion

to MacArthur's

the Joint

MacArthur asserted

hearings,

of a direc-

to the front

near the

Chiefs.

During the
of doing

impracticability
of drawing
0£ the Yalu. 2 The difference

short

abruptly

disregard

the necessity

between headquarters

burst

and in the
the war in Korea. 1 Gen-

of containing

aiiuded

eral

announcements

into

this
a line
of'

in Japan and the administra-

print

on February

14 when the New

York Times quoted the Far East aommander as stating:
The concept advanced by some that we should
establish
a line across Korea and enter into
. pos1tional
warfare is wholly unrealistic
and
illusory,
It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest
lateral,
the rugged terrain
which is involved and
the relatively
small force which could be committed for the purpose . 3 .
This

was a definite

tration

criticism

of a plan which the adminis -

might advance as an official

solution

of the Korean

problem,
According

to administration

next controversial
Iication

of the effect

might have taken
Joint

statement
-

Chiefs

MaeArthur~s

amounted to a nulli-

which the United

an armistice

.

Nations

On March 20 the

the Far East Commander of United

l illg . , p . 109!5,

3~

actually

of measures

to ensure

advised

officials,

2 Ibid.,

. , p. 475; quoted

by

p .. 1216 .

Senator

Johnson.
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Nations

preparedness

with the enemy.

ther

attempt

parallel

to dis eu:ss uconditions

It wa$ believed

was oros ,sed again.

the enemy• 1

Arthur to report
stiee

questions

and requested

for his forces

They nad>already

any request

in tbe .f'ield .

that

disadvantages

in the size

b·e practically

the existing

a publie

arising

from these

in adq.it.ion to
it would

were shocked when

statement

tha.tt

the enemy 1 there.fore,
must by , now be pain.fully •aware that a decision
o.f the United
Nations to depart from its tolerant
effort
to contain the war to the area of Kore.a
through an expansion of our military. operations to its coastal areas and interior
bases would doom R~d China to the risk or
imminent military
collapse.
These basic
facts being established,
there sl,Iould be
no insuperable
diffieulty
in arriving
~t
decisions
on t.he Korean problems if the
l Ibid.
2 Ibid

-

1,

p .., 41.l .

., P• 1197 ; testimony

in-

North Korea of the enem;.

Truman and his advis~rs

MacArthur issued

arm:ie

poli tieal

of' the opposing forces,

impa&aibl .e to cle'ar

President

Mac...

Indeed,- he continued,

.

upon air and naval operations,

the disparity

General

tbat

con•

in any agreement . 2

should not be increased

restrictions

instructed

by the Communists ~or.an

On March 21 MacArthur responded
because of the military

infor-

and maintain

This was to be sure

might be eqnsidered

hibitions

the

MacArthur needed in the next few

week$ to provide security
with

a .turw

chi.e.fs did not, .

The milita:cy

operations

mation on ·what authority

tact

in Washington that

should be made before

at negotiations

however, want to restrict

0£ settlement"

of General Collins .
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issues are resolved on their own merits,
without being burdened by extraneous
matters not directly
related
to Korea,
:suoh as Formosa or uh.ina• ·s seat in the
Unit$d Nations .1
The Korean nation and people, which
have been SQ cruelly ravaged, must not
be sacrificed,
This is a paramount concern~

Ap.art

.from the

area of

ilitary

the problem where issues are resolved in
the course o! combat, the .fundamental
questions continue to be political
in na~
ture and must find their answer in the
diplomatic
sphere.
witJhln _the area o! my
authority
as the military commander• however, it would be needless to say that I
stand ready at any time to con!er in the
field with the eommander-i-in-chief of the
enemy forces in the earnest effort to find
any militaey
means whereby realisation
of
the political
objectives
of the United
Nation$ in Korea, to whieh no nation may
justly take exception,
might be ac~om~

plished

without

!urthe -r bloodshed.

o! Defense Marshall

Secretary
0£ the witnesses

in enunciating

Arthur

'th.is

sals

in

making

the President

was the most emphatic

the dam~e done by Mac-

statement-.

He

the fighting

3 Ibid,,

asserted

that

propo-

were dropped wh-e.n11we

had spoken again with two voicee •••

-

·

had planned -to make and which had a

chance o.r terminating

1 Ibid.,

_

p. 1ox1
/ .•

-

2 IbiA
, u., pp.

,"'

qo
( - 72

fl

pp. 344 and 429. See also Acheson•s testimony (i6Ia:'~ pp. 1774-75). According to James Reston , this
statem~by
Mao.Arthur did not upset the administrative
applecart,
Because the Chinese offensive was well organized by thia time and the draft o.r the President's
state•
ment actually
offered less than Peiping had rejected
in
January, when the United States had s.pecitically
mentioned
discussion
of Formosa and or Chinese admission to the Un1ted Nations , the Chinese Oonununists _would not have accepted
Truman• s terms ( New Yot"k Times 1 May 9, 1951).~

6?
Letter
After
make plans

this

to Joseph Mart in

statement

of March 24 Truman began to

£or the removal of Douglas

cuse for doing so was offered
leader
the

Joseph

Martin

importance

on April

had requested

of Asia versus

House minority

.5.

MacArthur's

Europe

An ex-

MacArthur .

views on

in the world strug (.;le

and on the use of Formosan troo ps to open a second .front
t '1e pressure

to relieve

a speech

on Korea .

he had made advocating

He enclosed

the · text

Formosan action

against

In his answer to the Congressman,

the mainland .

of

G~nera l

MacArthur wrote;
My views and recommendations
with -_,respect
to the situation
created by Red China's entry
into the war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washin gt on in most complete deta;i.l •.
Generally these views are well known and generally understood•
as they follow the conventional
patt rn of meeting force with m;u:imum counter force .as we have never failed to do in th e past.

Your vi ·ew with

Chinese

forces

neither

logic

respect

On the respective

General

the diplomats

As you pointed

no subtsti tute

for victory

it

MacArthur
criticized

1951 ♦

did not

. "2
agree

what MacArthur

there

still

Europe's
fight

out , we must win .
This letter
with

of the

with

of Europe and Asia,

"Here we fight

words .....

that

utilization

importance

MacArthur wrote,

with arms while

to the

on Formosa is in conflict
nor this tradition.l

it

eonsid .ered

with

There is

indicated

administrative

always

war

agai .n
policy;

the Eur ope

1 u.s., Congressis>nal
Reco.r;<}, 82d Cong ., 1st S~lss~,
3280 . ·
·
r
2 r,t1):.itar1 Situa tion ~~ the Far Ea f'!l, p. 412.
.

I
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fir$t

of the Democrats and approved o! a policy

policy

Nationalists

regard

to the Chinese

.feared

might lead t<> a world war., Also• these

de!initel.7
cleared

foreign

involved
under

tial,

which the a.dministrs:tio:n

policy

even a.fter he had received

to clear

policy

ti ve Mart:tn read

statements.
the letter

the following

letter

con.t'ide :n--

a reminder .from -Washington

Thu-s, on April 5 Represent.ab.ef'o.re the Hous•e, 1

On March ,1 Henry Hazlitt,
MacArthur

The Far Ea~t oom....

to ke&'p his

Martin

paragraphs

and should have been

the Deoembe •r 6 directive-.

mander did not request

in

editor

of The Jreeman sent

telegran1:

Why do we fail or refuse arms to 400.000
South Korean draftees as reported New York Times,
March 31, dispatch from ?aegu? Previous statements President Rhee reported request for such

arms.

MacArthur's

answer

I hav-e delayed

31st pending receipt

as:
reply

to your message

o.! the

here (),f the re.fe:reneed New
There is nothing I ean add
York Times dispatch,
to the inf-ormatit)n therein
contained~
The issue
is one determined by the Republic: of Korea and
the U~t .ed Stat es Government ., and in!olVJ,$ 'basic
political
decisions beyond my au'thor1t;1 .

When in January the JOS had proposed providing

arms

tor thes,e same South Korean tx-oops, it had been MacArthur

who had recommended giving the ams instead
national

poliee . · To make e.f!eotive

to the Japanese

use of additional.

equipment.

'tihe Korean$ needed more t .raining.

suggestion

·ot January

6 and the writing

o! his

Between this

letter

to
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Martin,

tion

Mac Arthur

to Washin gton on this

Ridgway

that

had not ma.de ar 1y different

and Admiral

to G~neral

Bradley

units
t

others

reserves

of beth

.

recommended

Besides,

the LJ.00,000 Koreans

were suffering

had been the policy

still

be equipped.

tele gram were not trained
unfit;

General Matthew B.

question.

James A. Van Fleet

ne additional

recommenda-

mentioned

any additional

manpower available

up to strength

rather

in

the

Many were physically

from malnutrition
MaeArthur

aocording

.

Alo ; it

and Ridgway

t o keep the units

than to form new units . 1

to use

they had

CHAPTERV
POLICY ANDTACTICS I N KOREA
Differ i ng Aims of MacArthur and Truman
While questioning

ator

Saltonstall

Secretary

formulated

.o f Defense

in plain

part

of MacArthur's
that

advoeacy

in Korea .

of t•policies

mi · ht l e ad us to be able

Sen -

terms the divergent

aims of MacArthur and the President
spoke

Marshall,

The Senator

of action

to tell

on our

the m, ' Now we

are going to continue · to go on unless

you say you have had

enough.•t.t

policy

try

He pictured

to kill

so that

t bey say they have had enou gh . •

Secretary

take

as aiming "to

when they come on us ,

of! enough Red Chinese,

asked Marshall

added

administration

that

if that

' s reply

was not about the difference;

was "I think

i.f we infliet;ed

the initiative

in asking

of our soldiers

a nd prevent

s u.ces against

is about it . "
on the

Chinese,

for a cease-fire.

Marshall
we could

Above all,

a spread

t he sac:r-ific -e
of the strug f~le. l

the administration

American lives
the Chinese

the

whiC'h would stop

a solution

MacArthur accused

that

losses

we were seeking

sacri£icing

· When he

by

t1hich

70

not taking

of' needlessly
t he sterner

he advoc a ted o

mea-

Americans

?l
were horrified

at the idea

men bei ng killed
victory•

if the United

nitely,

the fighting

bility

of

possible

Mac rthur,

eTeatly

exa gge rated.

fashington

that

might well lead

forces

Accordi ng to

to wage war had .been

would disrupt

for the West

their

carrying

out M~cA~thur's

intervention

with Red China would 'be a tragic

' s viewpoint

proposals

and a tragic
Bradley,

words 0£ General

In the

econo-

possi ,ble . ;

not the administration

t o Russian

of the war .

ability

A block~de

was cet'tainly

Jelt

all

campaign to win .

the Chinese

the proba, ...

and increase

He ur ged putting

make a victory

This

continue d the war indefi-

would spread

General

my and thus

States

a definite

into

country-

would not be a total
of Communist gains. l MacArthur

War III,. 2

'orld

of their

when the result

but the prevention

held that

sion

o! thousands

extena war

the wrong place•
at the wrong time , and with the wrong enemy." 4 Marshall

considered

Mac

thur

China or the Soviet

and wreckins
world . u 5

the

According

willing

one "at

to risk

Onion a.t the expense
coalition

·o.r free

to General

Marshall,

11

war with Communist

was not a stalemate

of losing

peoples

throughout

t he situation

as long a.s the United

Nations

tain powers of maneuver and w.as inflicting
ment . 6

Dean Acheson went further
1MacArthur

re.ferred

· 2 Ibid . , p . 145.

5!_lli .,

P• 1007.

3,!lli.,
6 Ibid.,

-

severe

than this,

to ca$ualty

lists

P• 58.

P • 1?16 .

4

allies
the

in Korea
had cerpunish-

asserting

that

often.
Ibid .,

P • 7}2.

. ·

the operation

in Korea was a success , for the enemy had

been prevented

from accomplishing

its

declared

objective

_,-;

of driving

out of Korea and imposing
of a
on the pe ~insula . 1 The attainment

the United Nations

Communist rule
uni.fied

and·democratic

free,

1

military

aim of Korea,

ful means.

but should

invasion,

Collins

General

of four restrictions;

the United

by peace-

be acco mplished

' visit

MacArthur

to Korea after
proposed

in his speech before

he again made four proposals

April

be the

2

During General
Chinese

Korea could no longer

Nati ons ' position.

the

the lifting
Congress

in

for the amelioration

of

These were:

First,
the intensification
of our economic
blockade against China.
of a naval bloekade
Second; the imposition
against t he China coast .
on air reconThird, removal 0£ restriction
naissanee of China •s coastal areas ars.d of Man•
churia..
Fourth, removal of restrictions
on the
forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with
logistical
support to contribute
to their e!fec-.
tive operation
against the Chinese mainland . 3
The most dr~stie

o·f the reco mmendations

the bombin g of Manchuria-•although
undoubt edl y pr ef erre d such aetion--to
China's

coastal

carrying

area and Manchuria .

proposals,
did not agree to them . 4
1
2

out these

p . , 1?16 •

~

p .. 1729 ; c.f. Bradley's
4

-

.

3Ibid . , p . 3556.

the general

from

still

a reconnaissance
The general

testimony

Ib:J&., p . 198.

of

advocated

even if the United

.!E~•'

.,

was modified

'

Nations

-

(ibid . ,p.955).
.

Eeonomie . and liaval

MacArthur's

Blockades

.fili"st suggestion

impo.se an econornic

b;lockade

before

on China.,

thus

depriving

needed materials

from t he Western nations .

witnesses

on the advisil?ility

fact•

agreed

other

sure that

countries

Peiping

did not receive

of munitions

end. of 1949 European

Soviet

to make
materials, 1

strategic

E~bargoes

States

countries

allies

by December

were allowed.

By the

or the industrial

re garded as of: prime importance.

list

articles

not

had Americans .
Office

to go as far

ber by British
4

extent . 3 Tbe British

in ensuring

As Sena tor Wiley

had reported

May 1951,.

testi fi ed, the blockade

only to a limited

been willing

a sale

Malaya

l~~,

P• 1726 .

-'Ibi!:'i.,

P • 328 .

pointed

o.f 120,000

to China

This controversy

eased somewhat during

The

was expanded · in 1950 and 1951, 2

as Genera l Marsholl

been eff e ctive

to t he

items

which our experts

although,

of 19.50, ·

had embar goed shipments

bloc of about two-thirds

of forbidden

on

on othe .r

had be en placed

until,

to Peiping

fr<lm iimerica

no exports

In

to the Communist Chinese ever since

they had been in power ,
produ c ts by the United

measure .

measures

embargo by Western

There had b~en a general
the export

taken

or

her

Administration

of this

had already

was to

Congress

in the

4

out,

blockade

as

tons

of natural

nine

m-onths prec,eding

rub -

was

when .on May 18, 1951, a

!bid •• PP• 1724-25 and ~86.

Ibid.,

had

t he Colonial

over an econo mic blockade

the hearings
2

this

had

p . 424 .•
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United

Nations

tegi ·c exports
Although

the importance
ference

0£

resolution

called

£or an embargo on strato Communi st China. 1
MacArthur

an~ the

of an economic blockade,

opinion

on whether

nese mainland

sh0uld

tual

as threatening

blockade

Chi~ese

through

a blocka4e

a naval

favored

might eventually

a naval

danger

of. an early

ventured as far
· General

Russian

entran-0e

into

of

even over

believed

et.feet

Nevertheless,

an ac-

that

on the

he saw the

the war if

the tfa'WIJ

as Port Arthur.5
Collins

have to include

blockade,

have a serious

Chi-

Generals

General Marshall

Communist government . 4

Chinese

or the

of millions

Like MacArthur,

objeetions.3

was a dif-

blockade

the destruction
.2

starvation

there

agre ·ed on

MaeAmhur pictured

be mounted.

Wedemeyer and Chennault
United :Nations•

administration

Dairen

believed

that

a naval

blockade would
Vladi vcbstolt . 6 Bradley

and possibly

_opposed a nav~l blockade . as an act ...o:f war which would affect
1when a group of Republicans
presented
their views of
the hearings,
they accus_ed the Uui ted Nations
of taking
hes1tant steps toward ensuring an embargo . As an appendix to
the report they included summaries of the steps different
countries
had taken to ea:rry out the Nay 18 resolut.ion

(fill • ,

pp .•

3587

and

3625-55 ).

·

2 Ibid.,
Admiral Sherman agreed with MacP • 179.
Arthur's
estimation
that the Navy had enou gh ships to carry
through

a blockade

(ag . ,

p ,; 1527).

3rbid . , pp~ 2314 and 334-2 .
Japan

4

~

. , pp .. 355 and 359.

5Ibid . ,, P• 482 . According to Rovere and Schlesinger,
un~
MacArthur bad sent over 19.5 million
dollars

worth of materials
to China . 85~ of which was iron
sheet, machine tools,
etc. !Rovere and Schlesinger,

and steel
p. 222).
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not only China but also Russian Port Arthur and British
.
l
Hong Kong• . Aacording to Secret or y of State Acheson, the
success

of a naval

stances;

blocka de would depend on certain

a discussion

from the record

of these

cir~umstanees
was deleted
of the hearings. 2 While the blockade of

Korea did not involve

North

the possible
tries,

prejudieing

the imposition

raise

these

of a naval

questions

necessity

for

extension

any

of the security

.3

could ·get an effective

less

circum-

of other

bloekade

or

coun-

of China might

if the United Nations

In fact,

economic blockade,

a naval

of hostilities

hindrance

there

of ships

would be
entering

Ch1-

nese ports . 4
Bombing Manchur ia

Among the four proposals
General

MacArt ur included

he appeared
suggestion
churia,

before

a mild measure

the hearings
ritory

and asserted

way would not cause
Chinese

hordes

that

bridges

1Milita.rl
2

Ibid .,

5 Ibid.,

._...,.,...,

of air

he modified

reconnaissance

to the idea

,

this
over ManDuring

of bombing Chinese
Eastern

of the

which were then swoopin g down into

Korea ,

the

situ.t-ion
P• 1865•

P• 252 •

permission
Yalu . 6

to bomb the Korean end

Tbe JCS had also

in the Far East,
5Ibiq. .,
6 Ibid.,

p.

............P•

ter-

Rail-

To ta ke care

over

war . 5

When

to bombing .

bombing the Chinese

a general

MacArthur had been given
0£ the

in April;

in comparaison

he returned

Collins

the bombing of Manchuria.

Congress

to an advocacy

made to General

1831.

741 •

p~oposed

pp . 742 and 924.
4
Ibid . ; P• 172?•

?6
permitting
Chinese

rea.

to

American planes
territory

engage in "hot pursuit"

whenever enemy planes

Acheson and Truman concurred

doing this,

since,

would greatly
retary

as General

requested

rea to submit their
reserving

against

general

the

Defense Department
Nations

planes

ate plans

By the time this
forces

tbe Yalu River,

to General

of hot pursuit,

2

When

without

plenty

pp.

-

PP• 22?8•79.
1

of room £or chasing
Manehuria . 4 Aeeording

going into

!ill•,
:;rbid .

the Uni-

were about two hundred miles south o!

would not have been decisive

4

United

any immedi- ·

was received,

disapproval

Vandenburg, . although

-'Ibid. ,.,

that

to the

over Manchuria were dropped.,

hot pursuit

go.od !or morale , wit'h the limited

1

to go

Acheson reported

of the allies

flights

thus leaving

Communist planes

to the question

s.tay- away from Manehuria,

!or continuing

ted Nations

engaged in Ko-

the consensus

should

The Sec-

of the Ur..ited Stat-es

right

it

nations

the other

opinion.

of

Vandenburg had $Uggested;

reaction
the

in Ko~

in the advisability

improve the morale of the pilots.l.

of State

although

were caught

over

air

would have been

power avaiiable

in winning

it

the campaign.5

11:32 and 1388.

p . 507.

MacArthur

had told

TrWllan

at Wake

Island tha£ if the Chinese Communists attacked United Na•
tions forces,
the ai~ foroe would ttslaughtern them (S!12£~•
p . 45).
When the Chinese did counterattack,
the air force
did not

halt

them (New York 'rimesl

May 13, 1951).

5Ibid . 1 p . 1388. O'Donnell's
testim.omy shoved that
U. s. airmen in Korea had long !elt a sense of !rustration
at the limitation$
imposed by the policy of limiting
the
war;, in hi$ opinion, never had so many "inordinate"
advantages gone to an enemy ln a great conflict
(ibid.,
p, ,105).
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Washington even forbade
North Korean port
been carried

jected
its

of Racin .. However, one raid

because

of weather .

to any .further

location

The Joint

agreed

since

of this

us-efulnesa
since

rail

and road lines

Supplies

Collins

Arthur to do so, al~~gh

stating

1;hat restri(;tions

ind .icated
erations

rus, . ,

by cut-

.t'roin Russia. 2
Gen-

from Ma-e-

as November?

Shortly

in the feaeibility

that

for the North

request

on United Nations

forces
atter

when

had prothis

of carrying

rei .nf oreements

It was when Collins

MacArthur requested
1

as early

.for the enemr. 3

his belief'

and

the Far East commander had raised

in Korea to p~event

the Yalu .

farther

no speoi.fic

b! such action

vided a sanctuary

from Ra-

of bombing Manchuria itself,

could discover

the possibility

to the North Ko-

could be stopped

at a point

of

objection;

a railroad

Racin was not as good a supply point

ob-

border . 1

of Korea had not been completed

As .for the question
eral

the port beeause

to the validity

Koreans as was Chongjin .

ting

Department

miles from the Russian

as being somewhat limited,

cin down the coast

The State

against

they saw the port's

in addition,

reans

action

only seventeen

Chiefs

had already

order was given and a second had

out when this

been diverted

the Air Force to bomb the

he
out op-

from crossing

him in December that
he be allowed to bomb Manehnria . 4

PP • 7.50 and 1063 .

visited

2

Ibid .

t

PP • 750 and 22?5 ,

3Ibi.d . , p. 1288. According to Bradley, this was after
MacArthur'liad been given permissien to bomb the Korean end
of the bridges over the Yalu (illg, . , p . 741) .
4
~.,
P • 1290 .

?8
Administration
United Nations

officials

would not admit that

could have attained

any great

bombing beyond the Yalu.

According

.forces may have suffered

in a rather

the

advantage

to Marshall,

by

ground

remote way from Air

Force inab1lity

to bomb lines of supply an~ arsenals at
Mukden and Harbin. 1 Although Americ an air power could have
destroyed

many Chinese planes; _,,,,these planes had really not
been very effective
in action and had not attacked All ied
ground troops ..2 General Collins maintained that for such
action

to be effective,

not only airfields
which were often
Bradley

able air

th.e Air Force would . have to bomb

but also warehouses
in towns . 3

and other

out the nec ·:.ssity

of using

pointed

and naval forces

and sea era.ft

within

Korea .

could be gathered

only by stripping

other

..4

avail-

the

Sufficient

for MacArthur's

operations

buildings

planes

projects

Air Force Chief of

Sta.ff Hoyt Vandenberg spoke of the "shoe-string"
whe11 it

was viewed in its

MacArthur admitted

that

world-wide
the air

Air Force
commitments. 5 Even

power was not strong

enough

to de:fend both the United States and American troops in
Europe . 6 According to Vandenburg, all-out use of the air
forces

would n-0t defeat

Communist China , although

make the Chinese negotiate
l ;&bid. ,
P • 492 .

-

2

might

. ?- At the time of the hearings ,
Ibid .

t

PP • 492 and 886 .
5
p . 882 .

5Ibid . • p . 1246.

4

6

? Ibid • ., p . 1389.

Ibid .• P • 2874.

it

ill2. • -•

-

!!219.
•'

p.

1393.

-
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of about two hundred

the Air Foree had a Korean s~pply line
m.il ·es to work -on; and bombi.ng Manchuria

ble strictly

from a military

ger oi extending

the war .

Russia

should enter

supply

troops

depots

ed because
pots

to Marshall,

in the advent

that

would he very difficult

the effectiveness

in China would be less

to

of production,

normally
it

ment in Chinese

than

of hombing

sometimes assert-

dispersed supply deof air attaok . 2 As strategic

had cer t ainly

the possibility

bombing consists

thermore,

the war, it

the Chinese

against

Furthermore,

beeause of the dan-

in Korea or to ge·t them out . l

According
supply

viewpoint

would be inadvisa-

of at~empt i ng to destroy

could not be applied

possession

came mostly

sources

to China , for equip•
from Rus .sia.

the Chinese would be able to repair

Fur-

rapidly

any

damage done.3

Several
adam.antly
all

that

witnesses

ag~nst

and Bradley.

before

the committees were not so
as were Generals

bombing Manchuria

Wedemeyer agreed with

General

bombing Manchuria was a calculated

should

have taken .

He also

believed

whether to do so or not was rightfully
"commander in the .field
whatso-ever in carrying

MacApt hur

the allies

th at the d~cision

MacArthur's,

on

since

a

should be given no restrictions
out his mission . • • •

1 Ibi,d . , PP• 888-90 .

-

risk

Marsh-

2 Ibid .

1

General

P • 617 •

.?Ibid. , pp . 744 and 965; testimony O·! General Bradley .
4 Ibid., pp . 2315 , and 2516 . Generals Badger and Barr
agreed with General Wedemeyer (ipig, t pp~ 2798 and 2958) .
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O'Donnell

believed

that

we should

have bombed Manchuria

November 1950. but could not answer whether
still

.feasible

Strategic
Russia. 1

bombing was

duty o:f maintaining

in view of the primary

strong

in

Air Command in a position

a

to guard against

Formosa
The Joint

Chiefs

of Sta.ff

!or removal of restrictions

on the forces

of China with misgivings.
interests

of the United

Viewed MacArthur 's propos al

Expressing
States

of the Republic

tne belief

"the

that

of America coincide

with any-

one· who is opposed to Communism, 0 MacArthur advocated
plete

support

of the

parts

of the Formosan government

had no more defects

regime.

He maintained

that

al though

could be aritisized,

than some other

democracies

over the importance

eould p1ay in the struggle
in September

and October

economic and diplomatic
keeping
ports

the island
General

!rom the fall

1~

against
of that

Red China'i

it

Two studies

year had indicated

t hat

methods might not be suecess!ul
hands.

Wedemeyer suggested

On January},
2

~.t

in

In view of these

minimizing

of Formosa by explaining

. , p . 30?2 .

of the

of Formosa and the role

in friendly

the Voice of America . 3

it

did . 2

One must look back to 1949 to see the origins
argument

com-

re-

the damage

the situation

over

1950. the United

pp . 111-12.

'rbid, 1 p. 1672 .. General Wedemeyer asserted
that the
final po!Icy memorandum had never been referred
to him and
he doubted that it had ever been submitted to the Depart•• PP• 2296-97).
Acheson held that
ment ot Derense (~
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Press

published

an article

beginning:

The United)3tates
State Department has notified its attaches that the loss of Formosa, island redoubt of the Chinese Nationalists,
to the
Communists was to be ant icipated.
The Department said the public must be sold
on the idea that the island is of no strategic
value in order to prevent the loss of prestige
at
home and a bro ad•

to this

Re!erring
certain

article,

on l!~ormos-aof following

representatives

meant to Ulldermine the Nationalists
ing false

reports

that

the names of those
Acheson refused
all

rested

ance of officers

would fall .

send-

He requested

on the grounds

with him as Secretary

the names would increase

in the State

areas

dox ideas. 1

and of repeatedly

to give them, however,

releasing

controversial

the island

a course

who had drawn up the Formosan Document .

r~sponsibility

and because

Knowland accused

Senator

:Department

that

of State
the I'eluct-

to work in certain

where they might be aecus(;3d of unortho-

As a justification

for putting

forth

the For-

mosan Document, Acheson spoke of a necessity
the importance
tempted

to explain

statements
41

largely

States

of a territory

defense

meant that

the meaning behind

in the document .
because

of minimiz~ng
which might be lost. 2 He at-

of a mistaken
in the Pacific

the island

several

Referring

to the phrase

importance

to the United

," Acheson denied

was of no strategic

controversial

that

importance.

this
It

the Interdepartment
Coordinating
Staff,
including
representatives of the Army, CIA, and ECA, had seen the document
without making any suggestions
to alter it(~.,
P• 1828).
2
l~"'
pp. 1675-7? and 1683.
Ibid.,
P• 16?3.
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was intended

to counteract

the effect

of Formosa would be catastrophic
United

States

California

In reality•

the invasion

had strate g ic importance

means short

conditions

mit United

States

Official
of that

mination

for America,

the Seventh

Fleet

on Chinese

and sea operations

land.,

hand,

MacArthur that

and (3) under
to com-

On the twentyour deter-

to Formosan waters

fa.roes to cease air
other

should

of Formosa from the main-

the isl and and called

On the

(1) Formosa

Truman announced

an invasion

of

toward Taiwan

to promise

changed in June 1950.

month President

He ordered

nneutralize"

power,

it

policy

the fall

(2) the island

was not possible
forces to Formosa. 2

to prevent

land ..3

of employing

of South Korea:

out of' the hands of a hostile

existing

back to the

Acheson summarized American policy

from 1948 until

fifth

all

line

the loss
of the

would have been used to prevent

American troops

be kept

that

to the security

and would throw the defense

coast.

Formosa~~

of talk

the State

if Chiang Kai-sbek

against
Department

offered

to

Nationalist

the maininformed

troops,

he should

them .. The army o.r Taiwan was needed on the isle.nd

re:fuse

1 Ibid . , pp . 1804-05 . A debate over whether the Formosan Document should be published
ended with Acheson losing his fight against publication.
Maintaining
that he had
furnished
the document to the committees with the understanding that it would not go into the public record,
Acheson pointed to the possibility
of Russia using the official
document as a way o.f -di_scredi ting the Voice of itmerica.
Sinoe a summary bad already been released,
it appears that
. Acheson was thinking
of the damage an of i'icial
release
would do to the administration
.
2

~

. , PP• 16?1-?2 .
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to defend

they should

th

against

it

Chinese

Reds in the event

that

1

attack.

After

General MacArthur visited
the island of Formosa. in July, 2 he made several recommendations on arms and
needed by the Formosans.

equipment
using

in Korea o After

the troops

Korea , nevertheless,
insula

forces

the Chinese

that

According

Chinese

Nationalist

to MacArthur,

fensive

it

was unlikely

against

.Phere were several
for

Korea .

their

Chiang Kai-shek's

Peiping

reasons

opposition

would mount an of-

advanced by the Joint

th~re

was a continued

for armed protection

of the Formosan island.

March 1951 a icission

sent

lies

as ill-prepared
no longer

for battle.

recognized

As late

to Formosa had pictured

the Nationalist

in Korea or engaging

in
need
as

the

Since some of our al-

might well not welcome the idea of this
fighting

Communists

to using Formosan troops

to Marshall,

According

troops

were not

Taiwan.3

1

Chiefs

that

of

in the pen-

troops

had improved ., and, with so many Chinese

in Korea,

invasion

he began to blame failures

on the fact

being used.

He did not recommend

government•
government's

in diversionary

they
troops

activities

If tµe Chinese went to the mainland in
as MacArthur suggested, 4 the United States might

from Indo-China .
junks,

1 Goodrich,
PP• 110-11, questions
the wisdom of sending the Seventh Fleet to patrol the waters between the island and the mainland when many of the countries
in the UN
regime.
did not recognize the Nationalist
2 su;era, pp . 59--61.
3Ibid.,
PP• a4;:...a5
.
4 Ibid.,

p.

24.
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well become involved

in fighting

ali.5 t army would re quire

in China,

more logistical

for the Nationsupport

and better

trained

troops to carry out
successful
campaign on the
ma1nland . 1 One had to consider,
too, the possibility
that
the

.ussians

would picture

to the mainland
support

any return

as a causus

belli

If

the Joint

consideration

.Arthur,

Chiefs

o! Staff

roles

the hearings .

and in sending
the state

troops

military

Although

"there

the handling
1~.,

were important

subjects

and

discussed

debate,

war

a.a did

and the question

.

MacArt ur agreed

is there

in complete

that

"at

any question
control,n

in a campaign . "'2

p. 164; testimony

out poli-

of Defense

no time

interference
If this

of Bradley;

in

of the eivil

he also

'be no non-professional

of troops

have

of Congress in declaring

of the country

training

i on ·being

Department

abroad i:raised partisan

General

should

and the State

The role

our system of sovernment
a.dministrat

than did Mac-

of the Departments

of prePiredness

of universal

more factors

when making and carrying

in making decisions

during

had to take

when making a decision

interests

The proper

cies .

that

and the Civilian

so did the President

to weigh other

State

and would more actively

the Red Chinese .
The Military

into

of the Nationalists

asserted
in

bands-off

cf . pp . 33? and

619 .

2 Ibid ., p. 289; cf . Wedemeyer's statement on a commandingofficer's
role in carrying
out his mission (~uEra ,

p . 79) .
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attitude

on the part

war, the role
infringed
ried

of the President

upon .

The idea

out without

ignores

of civilians

being

the political

that

as chief

of state

military

plans

connotations

the Joint

Chiefs

out in a
would be

can be car-

to the diplomatic

adapted

such as the bombing of cities
Before

were carried

situation

of some military

actions,

.
of Staff

issued

definite

on any problem which might lead to political

ders

or-

reper-

cussions
the

, they asked tbe opinion of the State Department on
question at hand . 1 Louis Johnson had found his prede-

cessor

as Secretary

of Defense , James Forrestal•

about the domination
However , after

a system of liaison

ments bad been set
very cooperative
result

of the State

between the two depart-

in carrying

out joint

, the political

the Manchurian

border,'

but this

der was given,

not by changing

was a difference

opinion,

planning . 2
factor

for instan c e in the decision

where there

over Defense .

up, Acheson was , in Johnson's

of consultations

determinant,

Department

concerned

might be the

not to bomb near

was decided
directives
.4

of opinion

As a

be!ore

an or-

In question .a

between

tate

and

1 Ibid. , p . 898 ; t~stimony of General Bradley . A di·
rective-roMaeArthur
from the JCS was supposed to contain
only military
material . When political
reasonings
entered
the picture,
it was the President
who communicated with
MacArthur; thus, Truman included political
decisions
in his
note to the general on January 13, 1951, which had been excluded from the January 12 message(~
. , p . 905) .
3 ·
2
Ibid.,
pp . 257? and 2594 .
Ibid . , P• 502 .
4

.

Ibi9- . , pp.

Acheson .

740 and 1760 ; testimony

or Bradley

and
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Defense,

Marshall

could not recall

Commander in Chief had acted
Defense

in relation
tar's

fl

cision.

In war, indeed,

victory."

In these

military

win a war.

attempt

vances

was alien

standing
neither

a cessation
of territory

there

only to prevent

won.

not prolonged

for

MacArthur expressed

the

one side or the other

must

war in which the armed

the enemy .from making ad-

to the American idea of success,

notwith-

the War ot 1812 was one in which

Although

of hostilities

Republicans

often

stated

that

with the Communists in control

of the thirty-eigth
parallel
would be a
for the enemy, 2 and some pe•ople still
state that we

victory

north

lost

the war in Korea , i t seems to many others.

this

writer,

territorial

1~

that
gains,

by

preventing

including

the Communists from making

the West achieved

a victory .

. , P• 384 .

2 see conclusion
(ibid.,
P• 3605).

-

of

inde-

ean be no substitute

of limited

the .fact that
side

is victory,

' s view that

The concept

forces

to the Department
Department . 1

words,. General

strategist

where tbe

adversely

to the State

very object

any instance

of Repub l ican Senators

to this

e.f!ect

CHAPTERVI
OTHER NATIONS AND KOREA

Russia and the Korean War
In deciding
Comm
unist

China,

what measure s sho uld be taken against
t he allies

pact

Russia

and Ohina promised

petition

of aggression

of Japan

or any other

directly

or indirectly,

might construe
airplanes

this

and violation
state

treaty

act,

if

unite

vlith Japan,
·. 111 Russia

on the struggle

of

against

China

she so wanted. 2
re.fused

would require

assistance

for

There was no certainty

the ure-

to denounce even , the flying

bombing Manchuria

declarin g t hat losses

treaty.

of peace on t he part

i n a.ots of aggressi,,n

Douglas MacArthur

called

to prevent

which should

fro~ Japan to carry

as an aggressive

what Russia

in view of a 1950 Sino-Russian

would do, especially
·1n this

bad to consider

by the

to speculate
Russia

alliance.

on whether

to carry

out the

He countered

by

in Korea. could not go on .forever.
that

Russia

would stay

out or come

in .; on t hese t hings t he country had to take a certain
ris. k , 3 Indeed, the Soviet Union seemed to be less and less
2 !!2!g_. ,. p . 406;

testimony

'Ibid.,
p. 66; cf. P• 40 where MacArthur
recommeru!ations might not confine t he conflict

8?

of Marshall.

states his
to Korea, but
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with the Korean War. 1

linked
ing air

Bonet

assistance

and supplies,

the Chinese might not want

.

.forces in their

even while receiv-

Moreover,
2

country.

For one thing,

China

wanted Manchuria to remain part of her territory,
which might be endangered
large

scale

designs

into

t he war .

that

did not agree

witr .' MaoArtbur•

Truman had decided

Union and Communist China had called

between them 1n conneetion

that

the

it

her influence
This

~

testimcn,y

made by MacArthur

• t p. 480; testimony
o! Bradley .

up to the

the ter'!l.s of
to interpret

respond

was. according

tney would give us an opportunity
he hit us .
g.

eve ·n if

the Russians

That Russia would not necessarily

on the part of the United States

to live

i:n the Far East would

was true

were vague enough for
as they wished. 4

that
fore

to the treaty

with Korea and the alle ged re-

treaty

one 0£ two assumptions

the risk

The Soviet

attention

Also, 11' Russia failed

be threatened,.

s

of Ru$sian entrance

of war from bombing r>1anehuria was too great.

possibly

we had

there.3

President

terms of the treaty.

on

a bombing of that

Russia knew that

that

view of t he possibility

armament o! Japan.

on a

As for American designs

t he fact

The· administration

sanguine

were admitted

did not believe

would alter

no imperialist

rather

Russians

to China proper.

Manchuria. Mao rthur
territory

i!

a status

to aetion

to Acheson,

in drawing up his
to bit

o.f Marshall;

the enemy be-

e! .• p. 741,
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program.
actions

The administration,
which the Kremlin

to the Chinese large
taliatory

aetion,

however, was aware of three
might initiate:

numbers of planes

(2) intervening

war. 1

turning

with crews for re-

In contrast

tion

that

did believe

to this

idea,

of

was that

on our aide in the building

armed. strengtb..

mil-

and(:~) precipitation

MacArthur 's second assumption

time was not necessarily

over

in Korea with a half

lion or more ground "volunteers,"
an all-out

(l)

up of

the administra-

ti me was on our side,

not that

we

would match the Soviet

Un.ion "man for man and tank for tank,u
we could build an effective
deterrent
force. 2

but that

The hearings

brought

aid in the Korean War.
j ec.t were deleted

testimony.

MIG 15'a, fast

combat United Nations

and most of th

General

MacArthur did state

the difficulty

supplies

furnished

o! Senator

were used to

to the Yal.u and that

4

~•,

tanks

were o.f Russian manufacture. 4

MacArthur and General Brad ley spoke ot

of. di8eovering

exactly

how much influence

Ibid ., pp . 1718-19 . General Bradl ey testified
Russian-;r!lingness
to go ·to war on PP• ?.51 and 942.

~

by

Harry Byrd with state-

l

2

that

by the Soviets}

Russian -bu;i.lt jets,

approaches

artillery

Both General

.

sub-

on South Korea c ould not h~ve been launched

answered questions

ments that

on this

on seeuri ty grounds from the published

the North Koreans without
Bradley

som~ comments on Russian

Many of the statements

Nevertheless,

the attack

forth

• • P• 1720.
p., 995; cf.

'~•t

to

P• 17} .

testimony

o! M.ar$hall,

P• 623 .
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had on China in 1950 and 19.51.1

Russia

positive

on this

assumption

point

that

Marshall

was more

when he stated , "I have 5one on the

she [ Chinaj

was operating

not only

in con-

j unction

with but literally
under the direction
of the SoUnion . 0 ·2 Alth ough Russia and China were acting to-

viet

gether

in Korea, Acheson mentioned

partment

consideration

the continued

0£ a possible

Indeed, as Bradley pointed

country

to dominate

In considering

measures

the administration

that

i1.

China very long,_ ·

which might be taken

and of Russia.

with MacArthur .

in Siberia

to maintain

in Asia for any length

The general

that

sion was the fear

of time.5

the real

of being soundly

estimate

sian

possession

tary

power• and a growing e£fieiency

.,.

of Russian

was

believed

su.ffieient

ma-

campaign

General Sherman showed

view of Russian strength

deterrent

this

1J]l~

firmly

a major aggressive

hi.msel.f to be in sympathy with this
when he stated

in Korea,

Here again there

government had not stockpiled

the Soviet

terial

out, no

had to keep in mind the rela.ti -ve stre ·ngth

o.r the United States
disagreement

De-

s · 11t between the two

powerful countries.'
had been able

State

strength,

to Russian aggres beaten . 6 In refuting

Marshall

of the A-bomb, an increasing

assumed a Rusrelative

mili-

of weapons . 7

pp. 144 and 1001.

2

~
., p . 659. Acheson also expressed
a belie£ in a
closer conneetion between Communist China and the Kremlin
p . 1923).
than Mac.Arthur saw (ibid.,
4
3 Ibid. • P • 1 776.
Ibid.,
p . 1001.
.5Ibid. ,. p. 130.
.

1

6

~.,

P • 1.568 0

?_!lli . , PP • ?175-76.
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The United Nations in Korea
In deciding

what measures could be taken in Korea,

the United Nations

technically

the United St ates

ality,

tempered by its
Sinee there

desire

had the major role.

had the real

power of decision,

to keep the support

was no Military

Staff

In re-

of its

allies.

Committee in the United

Nations.

President Truman became the agent for all the
eountries, 1 Although the United States was to carr y out
United Nations resolutions

on Korea, it did not always act

in pursuance

of a UN resolution

e.g.

7 and October?,

on

July

.

On several

the Am
erican

occasions,
government acted

to or at tne same time it was seeking

previous

approval

for

an aotion. 2
General

mand for orders
resolutions
into

going to Korea.

the JCS prepared

all

consideration

cations.

the official

line

From general

United Nations

Marsha l l explained

Directives

a "precise

the military

Security

were discussed

involvements

on their
exclusively

and impli-

ot De-

were .rorwarded to the ...ecretary

Council.
with

MacArthurts

taking

directive,_H

£ense and the Pres ident,_ and i£ very important,
tional

o~ com-

Any political

questions

members 0£ the State

reports

originally

way to the United Nations .

on military

operations,

Supr eme Commander reported

directly

to the Nainvolved

Department .

went through

Later,

the JCS

wben reporting

the United Nati.ons
to the international

92
body . 1

Generally

this

worked well .

Nevertheless,

ing to Acheson, General MacArthur overstepped
in his twelfth

report

to the United Nations

his authority
by

stating

own views in what was supposed to be a "factual
of military
State

events . "

When acArthur

Department

objections
the United Nations . 2

maintaining
since

international

strongly
support

recitation
of

-

was .forwarded to

in the ne-cessi ty of

for actions

in Korea,

they were being taken in the name of the United Na-

tions . 3 Because the main resolutions

were in support
rea,

his

the validity

denied

·, the report

Dean fl..eheson believed

accord-

of a vigorous

they were little
Senators

several

o! the

war against

discussed

aggression

in the hearings .

in Ko•

However,

an Indian resolution

did attack

body •

world

of January

11 1 1951, callin g for a five - membe r grou p to consider
cease-fire

proposals

and an armistice

the United States,

Great Britain,

other

to

country

claim .ad that

were
the

The Soviet

Senator

Red China

by

Knowland referred

in the New York Times in which it was stated
dor Austin
Chinese

had voted for the resolution

Communist refusal

to Knowland, this
1~.

3~

and one

The Senators

made the concessions

proposal

Union•

Communist China,

be on the committee .

sing Formosa and of recognizing

on the committee .

.

of disc usincludin g her
to an ar tic le
that

Ambassa-

in expectation

to see the committee.

According

had been a dan gerous wager because

, P • 989.

~~.

. , PP• 1940- 41.

, Po 1981 .

of a
of the

. 93
poss.ibility
eeas.e-fire

1

of an acceptanee.
proposal

opinion

the

did not promise Formosa _and China to

It was meant to say merely

the Communists.

"if you people

of t~e United Nations , then you will

stop your defiance

have the chance to disouss,
de!iance , these

questions

f'urther

that

averred

In Acheson's

as you had a chance be.fore this

in which you are interested."

although

we did not consider

He

these

questions

part o! the Korean situation,
we could not pre- ·
vent other people discussing
them . 2 Acheson CQUld find
nothing

in the proposal

would confer

on the cease-fire•

on the inclusion
group. 3

centered

involving

was a prooedura.l

on whether

question

the United Nat ions was the

Nation$

a minority

by a majority

supp.ortedour

Part

Communist China's

not subject

spoke of our hope .of keeping

have insisted

China in any discussion

of Red Cbina in the United r ations .

discussion

United

how many nations

and we should

o! Nationalist

Another subject
seating

which indicated.

of the
entrance

to the veto .

Acheson

the Red regime out of the
vote.

poeiti<,n

If evidence
1

showed that

we would request

an

1 Ibid _., P • 523.
2 Ibid . , p .• 1784•

According
to Marshall,
the JCS had
recommended the omission of thes .e questions
from the ceasefire discussions.
However. they made no recommendation ae
to a discussion
or the -se questions in a !inal settlement,
a
suggestion
made in the .fifth principal
o!' tb.e Indian reso•
lution.
3
¼~;\~•,p .. 1969. The proposals a.re outlined on page
196? of the hearings .
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opinion

of t he World

Court

on the Charter

provision

that

the Republic

of China should be the permanent member of the
Council . 1 If a veto of the admission was being

Security
considered

, an opinion

the entrance

taken

into

of the World

Court

was a vetoable
consideration
.2

on record

question

of I taly

that

could

be

The Allies

Not all

Of course,

in Korea .
United

member nations

Nations

Russia

actions

made no contribution
were sixteen
American

questioned

Were

they contributing

Were

they

tration

which sent

During

their

share

to c~mpromise

Had the

allies

ing Europe at t he expense

Many Senators

pictured
to support

military

appearing

Defense

pointed

this

But there

Senators

of these

countries

.

of men and material?
with the aggressor

and

on t he adminis-

Was the administr

at ion favor-

of Asia?

much as t hey could

al l y agreed with

Others

the hearings

put pressure

to remove MacArthur?

.

.

all

to fi ght with

the contributions

too anxious

officials

units

fought

opposed

with the aggressor

of manpower or material

countries

with Russia?

Nations

and her satellites

to deal

and Korean troops •

repeatedly

of the United

the allies

as not doing

the Korean War .
before

judgment,

Although

the commit tees

the Secretaries

to some of the reasons

for this.

as

gener -

of State
Acheson

and

----------------------------------------1 Ibid . , :p. 2023 .

China•s~rance
there and this
2

!ill · ,

ire

p.

enator Smith opposed Communist
into the UN because Russia was in control
ant a conquest by an external
power.

2024- .
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spoke

of the

to do all
tish

allies

aware'' of the inability

1

as

'painfully

they -would like

had been carrying

to do.

For some time the Bri-

on guerilla

warfare

in Malaya,

while France had been struggling
to maintain her position
in Indo-Cbina. 1 Marshall mentioned the inability
of some
countries

to do more because

considered

other

nations

tl ·1e war near

down some o!fers

an end.

many men.

all

Furthermore,

ha.ve had to furnish

and logistical

Then too,

support

troops,

we

for Mac-

ha.v-e at lea.st

w-hen the United States

would

transportation,

training,

!or the troops

2

we had turned

accepted

units

equipment,

all

troops, _ since

than a. thousand

of less

issues.

might even have

from sending

Arthur had request -ad that
this

political

1950 the United States

In October
discouraged

of internal

offered,

they were

not accepted.3
Secretary

of State

were too anxious

France,

0£ limiting

on major measures

in Korea.

lins

was asked

port

throug ,'1 ·approval

whether

he did not think

The foreign

to compromise.

the United States,

the importance

Acheson did not think

they

ministers

and Great Britain
4

On the other

the- allies

of

had diseuased

the war and were in full

accord

hand, when Col-

were giving

us .full

of our actions,

his

we1.•esupporting

us to the extent

should.,.?
Ib.;d P• 1?72. 2 -:...•,
PP• 950 and 980-81.

P• 1225.

the allies

P• 607-

.

sup-

answer was that
they
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MacArthur

should go it
p lans

the United

alone in Korea; he believed,

States

however,

that

his

would be support ·ed by a majorit y of the

.for victory

United Nations. 1
interest.

tha.t.- if necessary,

held

If to help an ally

the country

were in the American
to .help an ally

should do so; i!

ran

contrary to American interest,
the country should not do
so. 2 This point of view did not accord with Bradley's
idea
that

propaganda,

States

might,

not military

to win the

war.

would help

T·o win in this

field

the

governmen t wou.ld have to cooperate

with other

ing the same ideals

3

and. objectives.

As for alleged

pressure

from other

move MacArthur , Acheson asserted

the United
Anlerica.n

nations

countries

hav-

to re ....

they had opposed

that

several
about some of bis statements. 4

tbe

Supreme Commander•s policies

times

ried

There had, however,

been no pressure
the general
ter

as leader

his removal,

approval
that

brought

it

on the administrat

of the United

Nations

have taken

by the allies,

place

l Ibid.,

pp.

3~.,

P• 730.

4

6 N~w York ~ ime§t April

with a consensus

of trying

2 Ibid.,

Ibid.,

a general

MacArthur often

policy

168 and 296.

Af-

Asia

During World War II General
of the administration's

troops.5

6

earlier.

Europe versus

plained

ion to replace

the New York Times re ported

of Truman•s actien
should

and were wor-

P•

1733 ►

12, 1951.

comto bring

P• 108.

5Ibid.,

P• 1879.

9?
the war in Europe to a finish
in t he Paci.!ic. 1

to h.is forces
voiced

the same complaint.

holding

a large

sition

that

trial

He disagreed

Russia' ·s real

supp rt

or

with the policy

in Europe under

aim was to conquer

With this

Congressman Martin this

all~-0ut

During the Korean War he

number of troops

countries.

giving

before

t he suppo-

these

indus-

in mind he had written

to

comment:

It seems stran ge ly difficult
!or some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist
conspirators
have elected to make their play for
global conquests,
and tha t we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield;
tb at here we
fi ght Europe's war with arms whil.e the diplomats
the:re st -ill f igllt it with words; that if we lose
the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe
is inevitable,.
win it and Europe most pro~ably
would avoid war and yet preserve freedom.

Marshall

Generals

goal was to achieve

United States

and Bradley

domination

must ensure

Europe 's manpower of three
industrial

capacity

Air bases
a striking

Soviet
4

Added

greatly

!fistorz

hundred million

reach

oil,

to the communi$t bloc,

increase

Russia's

strength

1courtney

Whitney,

MacArthur:

(New York: Alfred"

area.

communism?

ior maintaining

industrial

bases,

the

and her great

ei ties

Moreover, if' the United States
.East

vital

against

were e&sential

main

Russia's

klnd that

the freedom o.f that

power which could

it would lose Middle
ials.

over Europe

made her . the bulwark

on the continent

Union .

held that

lost

and strategic
these

-o.f ·the

Europe ,
mater-

reseurze ·s would

as an opponent.5
Mis Ren~ezvoua wi'th

A"- Knopf' Co.;

I9Sg},

PP•

'3&,;-37.

2N11itm; ..§.it1;1ation in t'he Far East, P• ~544~
3;tR!~•, p. 7.31, 4 Ibid., p. 88}.
5rbid., p. 742.
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General
perhaps

MacArthur admitted

he did not kn ow all

ministration

to place

tor McMahonexpressed
defend

during

the factors

such a stress

a desire

t he American nation,

Staff

and the

Mae.Arthur replied,

agencies

ing day and ni ght !or an over-all
problem !11

1 Ibid .,

-

p.

?6.

lihen Sena -

to know how MacArthur would

were in t he Pacific,

various

th at

which led the ad-

on Europe.

do esn 't happen to be my responsibility,
sponsibilities

the bearings

"That

Sena.tor .

My re-

and 'the Joint

Chiefs

of the government
solution

of

are work-

to the global

CHAPTERVII
CONCLUSION

The committee hearings
almost two months

andover

ended on June 2?, 1951,
two mi llion

On August 17 the two committees

beginning .

more and adopted a .resolution
records,

report

and appendices

or reaching

could submit their

quently.

to transmit

any conclusions.

pr ivate

pointed

view.

that

to the testimony
that

General

Hurley's

testimony,

General

o! the Republic

Yalta was one of the greatest

tragedies

being

capable

o•Donnell

o.f carrying

t hese Re-

to
of China•

Barr contradicted
supported

while General

Subse-

failure

r

testimony

tory,

members

of Vice Admiral Badger

a United States

arms caused the downfall
that

a

.filed .a long and virulent

publi~ans

alth ough admitting

filing

Neve~theless,

In a summary of witnesses•

evidence

the hearings,.

views to the chairman,

a group of Republicans

as conclusive

their

convened once ·

to the Senate without

report . 1

provide

words after

estimated

this

the thesis
in our his-

the Air Force of

out MacArthur's

suggestion

o.r

---------------------------1Republic ans signing

the report

were Style

Bridges ,

Alexander \t/iley. H. Alexande:i:- Smith , Bourke B. Hiokenlooper, llilliam F. Knowland, Harry P. Cain, Owen Brewster,
and Ralph Flanders .
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bombing Manchuria .
point

of view .

They thus

In their

from the testimony
since
dict

it

vindication

claimed

opinion,

of General

little

Bradley

of Defense

be learned

or the Joint

would have been embarrassing

the Secretary

could

of their

Chiefs ,

for them to contra-

or to oppose administration

policy .
These

epublicans

mentn representing
regardless

11

conviction

l party

forth . 11
that

as a result

areas

of "agree -

to these

administration
to~ard

which anyone

would draw after

The preface

the

one of appeasement

thirty

common-sense conclusions

of politica

hacl een set

outlined

items

read,

."

This statement

of the tone

of the rest

of the report .

tration

might well

have agreed

with the judgment

in a few of the areas , e . g ., that

had the right

never violated
offered
about

by

to remove General
military

the general

a victory

.

such a way that
tration's

United States
level

they conveyed
e . g .,

that

of the

MacArthur

the recommendati ons

on his desire

n agreements"

a criticism

The adminis-

to bring

were. slanted

with

the milit ary potential

expenditures
to defin~ . 1

our political
and that

limited

in

of the adminis-

World War II was not maintained

after

commensurate

financial

were based

Other of the

policy,

that

is indi-

the President

~acArthur • that

directives,

was

to be fact

cative

Sena tors

"The

' s Far East policy

communism was proven

of the investigation

the facts

committments

of the
at a
or

war is impossible

-------·---~------------------
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A!ter
Far East

boring
the

condemning the administration

policy

and accusing

Communists,
and naval

air

mendations.

the State

the Senators
forces

supported

In their
pressed

conclusion,

the belie.f

that

agreed

,. 2

of killing
to produee. 1

more Chinese

t he Republican

Senators

parallel

In a separate

£or

Henry Cabot Lodge,

Jn

on most questions,
but
more empha.sis on the ' Korean War. 3 In a much more

reason.able

report

the eonclusions

report

Senator

Saltonstall

of the other

agreed with most

Republican

Senators,

with the bases on which they had been predicated.
emphasized

a point

General

completely

MacArthur's

policies.

He correctly

statements

in influencin

judged

but not
He also

caused considerable
of the , United

the importance

g t he administration

Nations•

of the hear-

on the importance

(1) keepin g Formosa out of Communist hands , (2) lceeping

Red China out of the United Nations,
delayin g American
l

Ibj.d .,

:;Ibid.,

p.

recognition

3590.

P•· 3659 .

2

0£

1.2.li·• ,

4-

or

i gnored by his colleagues-

doubt in t he world as to his support

ings

of

would be a victory

statement

with the committee

placed

that

ex-

a peace based on t he division

Korea at the th i rty-eighhh
aggression

use of

would ensure the vic-

tory which the "immoral pelicy
Communists" was not likely

a greater

MaeArthur' ,s recom-

this

that

post-war

Depc>.rtment o.f har-

by .following

They contended

in its

and (3) indefinitely

Communist China. 4
pp . 3600-05 .

l;bid . , PP• 3659-60.

of
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Wayne Morse, still
his independence

a Republican

criticizing

by

partisan

and biased•"

a discussion

of whether MaeArthur•s
In Morse's

opinion•

of MacArthur ' s ultimatum
with him to negotiate

emphasis Republicans

control

They were content

Results
the country .

an article

praise

report

1

of the hearings
written

shortly

s testimony

MacArthur .

were both good and bad fer
out s ome 0£ these

before

led to protests

results

the end of the sessions .
against

t he shipment

to Communist China and an embargo on

ation

althou gh it

as

themsel Yes rest

in recalling

Arthur Krock pointed

which the administr

on th ., hearings .

of the way in which Senator

t hese goods i mposed by the United

l'lations

had dismissed

was evident

whi~h he was dismissed

l~-,

of the Nationalists

the hearin gs .

ot strate gic materials

clearer,

the

or the aid they gave to the

to let the hearings

had conducted

MaeArthur

to · 111eet

the Democrats should have

of Truman's justification

There was general

in

because

Although deploring

Democrats. had no general

Russell

especially

his

.1

f-Iationalists

evidence

as

in avoiding

to the Chinese leaders

he thought

on greater

report

conduct justified

put on the ousting

from Oh.ina proper,
insisted

especially

it did,

a pe~ee .

e , showed

ti

the Republican

"very highly

removal .

at this

that

was ill-advised

P• 3662.

2 New York Times, June 1, 1951.

--·----- -

.

The reasons

for ·

MacArthur were
the
.2

abrupt

manner in
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The hearings
strategy

.

also

They resulted

United States

that

Nations .

for the allies

the pretext

the

a third

revealed

attack

by the Russians

the military

true

in other
that

1 Ibid . , .\)ril.

spots

the Russians

of the division

tween the United States

in several

disclosures

from the published

Milit§U7

the tranof favoring

respects

that

reduo -

and its

reports.

could glean
Several

of opinion

an
It

much
articles

areas

were .

over Korea be-

as well as between

26 , 1951 .

ituation

Brad-

the United

might incite
of the world. 2

out what these

allies,

.

the prolonged

was endangering

in the New York Times pointed

2

views on Korea,

As

and the amount of money being

situation

and that

picture

to avoid

time and time again.

the hearings

during

States

The full

him . 1

to control

was the position

were harmful

of the military

information

tactics

on the war .

ley had testified

was undoubtedly

MacAfth~

and at the same time advocating

the number of troops
to carry

removed

more to Korea on

ability

how illogical

The hearings

probe

of General

Republican

MacArthur ' s proposals
tionsin

forcefulness

not to contribute

world war was demonstrated

scripts

to

wanted peace and desi:r•ed above all

!or the conservative

spent

Truman ' s determination

in the President's

nation

by the

statements

and this

of disapproving

and disbelief
That

in positive

the war was clearer

an excuse

a review of Korean War

we would oppose Chinese Communist admis-

sion to the United
contain

necessitated

in ~he Far East , p. 953.
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MacArthur and the administration.

was shown.

ness of future

by the Republicans,

revealed,

policy,

as charged
tact

along with tre

that

The vaguewas

we did not consider

our~

selvesEtrong
enough to wage a successful
war on a lar ger
.
1
scale..
This vagueness au to future action stemmed partially

from our lack of concrete

conditions

behind the Iron Curtain.

were attempting

we had many casualties
propaganda machine . 2
On the other
dismissal

peace treaty

removal. did not materialize
departure

from Japant

were,

government

subsequently,

agreement

.

that

Dulles

our policy

no great

on what the treaty

after

should

MacArthur's

-

and carried

·decision

be.fore · the

himself

said

"high

it

to remove Mac-

court

of publ i c opinion
would have to . 4 In spite

Ibid .. , May 13, 1951 .

3m11tarz
4

-

There

in coming to an
contain, 3 General

1New York Times May 27 , 1951 .
1
2

the

e£fectively.

had passed

as the general

on

from the

had not changed.

obstacles

Thus the administration's
Arthur

effect

informed

Ridgway took command of the Far East theater
out his mission

of the

resulting

Immediately

John Foster

and

results

of a harmful

negotiations

we

to the Russian

predicted

Forecasts

that

as possible

gave impetus

handt several

did not oeour .

the Japanese

Our admission

as many Chinese

to kill

that

Japanese

knowledge of actual

Situatiop

Ibid . , p . 102 .

in tbe,Far

E~~t• P • ?52.

,0

105
of the initial

uproar

over the wey the dismissal

had been given and the tumultuous
Arthur

on his return

on limiting

to the United States,

the war were justified

tbe succeeding

reception

Republican

notice

given Mac-

Truman's views

and were followed .by

administration

.

APPENDIX
Message .from Joint

C·hie.fs

of Staff

to General

MacArthur on December 6, 1950

6 Deco,

From Joint

Chiefs

of Staff · to Commander-in-Chief,

Tokyo, Japan (and other

commanders):
as of 5 Dee. , forwarded

'50

Far E st,

·

1 . The Pr esident,
a memo te all
Cabinet members and to the chairman n.s.R.B., administr
tor
E.C.A. , director
a.I.A., administrator
E.S.A. and director
Selective
Service,
which reads as follows:
I
. lfin the light of the present critical
internation~l
situation,
and until further written notice from me, I ~ish
that each one of you would take immediate steps to redu9e
the number of pu blic speeches pertaining
to foreign or ilitacy
policy made by officials
of ·t he departments
and a encies of th e Executive
Branch.
This applies to official
in
t _he field
as well as t hose in Washington .
11
No speech, press release,
or other pub lic stateme t
concernin g foreign policy should be released
until it ha
received
clearance
from the Depi."tment of Sta te. }
" No speech, pl;"ess re ,lease,
or other statement
concernin g military
p olicy should be released
until it has
received
clearance
from the Dei;artment of Defense.
11
In addition
to the copies submitted to the Depart
ents of St ate and Defense for clearance,
advance copies of
speeches and press releases
aoncernimg foreign policy or
military
policy should be submitted to the White House fr
information .
"The purpose of t his memerandum is not to cu rta · iL he

f low .of informat~on

to the American P:ople,

but rat her

tj
1

insure that t he in.form at i _on ma.de public is accurate
and
fully in accord with t he policies
of t he Unit ed Stat es G v-

ernment.

'

-

2. He also forwarded the following
to the Secretary
f
State and Se cretary
of Defense:
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
"Officials
overseas,
including
military
commanders
and diplomatic
represe -ntatives,
should be ord ered to exe cibe ex trem e caution in public statements,
to clear all
t
routine
statements
with their departments,
and to r~frai
from di r ect commun ieation
on military
or foreign policy w·th
newspapers,
magazines,
or ot her publicity
media in the
United States.
3. The above is transmit ed to y ou for g uidance and
app ropriate
action .
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10?
Excerpts

from President
Truman's April
11 Address to the Nation

The whole Communist imperialism
is back of the attack
on peace in the Far East . It was t he Soviet Union that
trained
and equipped the North Koreans for aggression.
The
Chinese Communists massed forty-four
well-trained
and w 11equipped divisions
on the Korean frontier.
These were he
troops they threw into battle
when t he North Korean Com unists were beaten.
The question we have had to face is whether t he C
nist plan of conquest can be stopped without general w •
Our Government and other countries
associated
with us i
the United t1 ations believe that the best chance or stop ing
it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea
def e ~t it there.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
We do net want to see the conflict
in Korea exten ed.
We are trying to prevent a world war• -not to start
one.
The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the
other free countries
will conti nue to resist
the attack.
But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to
punish the aggressor?
Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China
itself?
Why don 't we assist
Chinese Nationalist
troops to
land on the mainland of China?
If we were to do these things we would be running a
very gra ve risk of starting
a general war . If th at were to
happen, we would have brou ght about the exact situation
e
are trying to prevent.
If we were to do these things, we would become ent gled in a. vast conflict
on the continent
of Asia and our
task would become immeasurably more difficult
all overt
e
world .
1

ald

. . . First
. . .. of. .all,. . it. .is. .cle~. . t.hat. .our. .efforts
. . . .in. Kore
.. .

can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue
the strug gle.
The United Iations
forces have put up at
mendous fight in Korea and have inflicted
very heavy cas alties
on the enemy. Our forces are stronger
now than
have been before.
These are plain facts which may disco r. e the Chinese Communists from continuin g their attack .
Second, the free world as a whole is growing in mi itary strength
every day.
In the United States,
in ~esteJn
Europe, and t hrou ghout the world, free men are alert to ~he
Soviet t hreat and ar e building
their defenses.
This may
t he Communist rulers from continuing
th e war n
discourage
Korea--and
from undertaking
new acts o.f aggression elsewhere.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I believe that · we must try to limit the war i n Kor a
£or t hese vital reasons:
to make sure that the precious
lives of our fighting
men are not wasted; to see that the
security · of our country and the free world is not needles . ly

tiey
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jeopardized;
and to prevent a third world war .
A number of events have made it evident that Gene al
MacArthur did not agree with that policy o I have thereto.re
it essential
to relieve General Mac.Arthur so
considered
that there would be no doubt or confusion as to t he rea
purpose and aim of our policy .
It was with the deepest pe rsonal regret that I fond
myself compelled to take t his action . General MacArthu is
one of our greatest
military
commanders.
But the cause o.f
world peace is more important than any individual.
Excerpts
Joint

from Address of General MacArthur
Meeting of Congress on April 19

to

Mr. Sµeaker, distinguished
Members of
Mr. President,
the Congress, I stand on this rostrum with a sense of d
humility and great pride; humility in the wake of those
great American architects
of our history who have stood
here before me; pride in the re!lectiori
that this forum
debate represents
human liberty
in the pure
legislative
form yet devised . [Applause~
Here arc centered the hopes, and as pirations,
and
faith of the entire human race ~
I do not sta nd he re as advocate for any partisan
cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite be
They must be
yond the realm of partisan
consideration.
if ou
resolved on. the Aighest plane of national
interest
course is to prove sound and our .future protected.
I
thex-efore, that you will do me the justice
o.f receiving
hat
which I have to . say as solely expressing
t Le consi der ed
viewpoint of a fellow American . I address you with eit~e r
rancor nor bi t terness
in t he fading twilight
of life wit~
but one purpose in mind, to serve my countryo
(Applause~
The issues are global and so i nterlocked
that to c nto those of
sider the problems of one sector oblivious
another is but to court disaster
for the whole .
While Asia is commonly referred
to as the gateway o
Europe, ·tis
no less true :;nat Europe is the gateway to
Asia, and the broad influence
of the one cannot fail to
have its impact upon the other.
There are those who claim our strength
is inadequa
to protect
on both fronts,
that we cannot divide our eff
o.f_defeatism.
(ApI can think of no 0 reat e r expression
plausetl
If a potential
enemy can divide his strength
o
two fronts,
it is for us to counter his effort.

t1st,

•

•

e

•

•

•

•·

Our strate

•

•

•

g ic

•

•

•

frontier

•

•

•

then

•

•

•

•

shifted

•

•

•

•

•

•

to embrace

•

e

the

•

s

entire Pac ific Ocean which became a vast moat to protect
as lon g as we held it. · Indeed, it acts as a protective
shield .for all of t he Americas and all free lands of the
Pacific Ocean area.
We control it to t he shores of Asia
a chain of islands
extending in an arc from the Aleutians
to the Marianas held by us and our free allies.
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

f

•

•

•

•

•
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The holdi ng of t his littoral
defense line in the
western Pacific is entirely
dependent upon hol din g all
segments t hereof, for any major breach of that li ne by
unfriendly
power would render vulnerable
to determined
I
at tack every other se gment.
es t ima t e as to which I have yetj to
This is a military
find a militar y leader who will take exception.
CApplau~11
lse:}
For that reason I have s t ron gl y reco mmended in the
past as a matter of military
urgency t hat under no ci · · stances must Formosa .fall und er Communist control.
(Appl use'J

. . . While
. . .. .. . . .. .. . ..
I .,;as not co nsulte d prior

~

...

.. .... ..

0

•

to the President• s
decision to in ter vene i n support of the Republic of Kore ,
t ha t decision,
from a military
standpoint,
proved a soun
one.
As I say, it prove .d. a sound one• as we hurled back
the invader and decimated bis f orces.
Our victory was
complete and our obJe-etives- within reach when Red China
intervened
with numerically
superior ground f orces.
This created a new war and an an entirely
new situ ticn
not conte mplated when our forces were committ ed again s t he
North Korean invaders,
a sit uation wh:tch called for new
decisions
in t he diplomatic
sphere to permit the realist
c
adjustment of military
stra t egy.
Such decisions
have not been forthcoming.
While no man in his right mind would advocate send
ing our ground forces into continental
China, and such w s
never given a thou g ht, the new situation
did ur gently de aid
a drastic
revision
o! strate gic planning if our politica
aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated t he ld.
Apart f r om t he military
ne ed, as I saw it, to neutralize
the sanctuary protection
given t he enemy north o
Yalu, I felt t hat milit ary necessity
in the conduct o.f t e
.first,
t he intensification
of our ec
war made necessary,
omic blockade against China; second, the imposition
of a
naval blockade against t he China coast; third,
removal~
restrictions
on air reconnais s ance of China's coastal
a as
and of anchuria;
fourth,
removal of restrictions
on the
forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logisticail
support to contribute
t[o their effective
operations
against
the Chinese mainland.
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In war th ere is no substitute
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for victory.
There
some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China.
They are blind to history's
clear lesson, for history
teaahes ,, with unmistakable
emphasis,
that appeasement but
It points to no sin gle inbeets
new and bloodier war.
stance where t his end has justified
that means, where
appeasement has led to more tban a sham peace.
Like blae mail, it lays t he basis for new and successively
greater
violence becomes the only
demands until,
a s in blackmail,
other alternative.
why, my soldiers
asked of me, surrend r
militar y ~dvanta ges to an enemy in the field?
I could no
answer.
lApplause J
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